Internet Defamation Blog

posted by Aaron Morris on Feb 13

I get calls every week from people wanting to sue for defamation for something that was said in a declaration. The declaration may have been filed in support of a restraining order, or in family court where parents are fighting over custody of their children. The declaration includes terrible lies about the caller, so he or she wants to sue for defamation.

No can do. For a statement to be defamatory, it must be unprivileged. Public policy and statutes create a number of privileges that keep a statement from constituting defamation. For example, in California, and likely every other State, a statement made in conjunction with a legal action is privileged, and therefore immune from any claim of defamation. It may be hard to swallow that people can lie about you in a declaration and yet be immune from a claim for defamation, but it has to be that way. Imagine the backlogs that would occur in the courts if every declaration filed yielded another lawsuit for the lies allegedly told in the declaration. Indeed, if suing for something said in a declaration was permitted, then you would be compelled to sue every time the other side filed one. After all, if you didn’t, the Court would have to view that as an admission. Of course, the newly filed lawsuit would generate declarations, so that person would now file another lawsuit, and so it would go, ad infinitum.

When I explain this reality to callers, I generally get a response that goes something like this:

“So you’re telling me, she can say ANYTHING she wants to, and there’s NOTHING I can do about it?! She can claim I’m a murderer, and I just have to take it. She can claim that I rob banks and molest my children, and I just have to smile. Is THAT what you’re telling me?”

No, that’s not even close to what I am telling you. You can’t sue for defamation, but that doesn’t mean you have to take it. You don’t need to file a separate lawsuit for something said in a declaration, because you are already IN a lawsuit. That’s why litigation is called an adversarial system. Your ex-wife files a declaration saying you beat the children, you respond by filing your own declaration saying you don’t, supported by additional declarations from friends and family saying they have never seen you mistreat your children.  Every trial involves witnesses testifying to very different versions fo the facts, and the judge has to decide whom to believe.  Conflicting declarations are no different.

Plus, lying in a declaration is called perjury. That’s a crime. So, your spouse doesn’t get to say ANYTHING she wants, because she can go to jail. Admittedly, declarants are seldom prosecuted for perjury, but if they tell lies, they lose credibility with the judge and lose the case because your skilled attorney will show them to be the liars they are.

So, back to the Wisconsin case.

The case involved a defamation action against the Milwaukee Brewers and its longtime radio commentator, Bob Uecker. In 2006, Uecker sought an injunction against someone named Ann Ladd, claiming Ladd was harassing him. Ladd was charged with felony stalking around the same time. That criminal charge was dismissed, but the civil court issued the injunction requested by Uecker against Ladd.

Ladd then filed a defamation lawsuit against Uecker, claiming the declaration he provided in support of the injunction was defamatory. But we know a declaration filed in court can’t be defamatory because it is privileged. The judge knew that too, and held that the allegations failed to state a claim because they were privileged. (See, I don’t make this stuff up.)

But as judges often do, he continued to analyze the case under other considerations. The declaration by Uecker, which is a public document, had been published on the Internet at thesmokinggun.com. Ladd was suing for that publication, but it had occurred more than two years prior to the time she brought her action, and would therefore be barred under Wisconsin’s statute of limitations. Ladd argued that the statute had not run, because the declaration was still available on the site, and that every time someone saw the continuing publication, that started a new limitation period.

The court did not agree. It chose to follow the “single publication rule” which holds that, like something published in a newspaper, an article published on the Internet starts the statute of limitations clock running, and that clock is not reset every time someone sees the article, or even when it is republished by another site. If such were the case, the statute of limitations would go on forever on the Internet.

posted by Aaron Morris on Sep 11

A hard-fought victory for free speech.

The defendant in this case was Elvia Orrillo-Blas, an emergency room doctor at a hospital in the Inland Empire.  When it was decided that her annual contract to provide services to the hospital would not be renewed, she took to the Internet, posting multiple defamatory messages on Craigslist.com about the director she felt was responsible for the decision not to renew her contract.  In the anonymous postings, she would sometimes pretend to be a nurse or patient at the hospital when making her false claims about the director.  The director retained us to sue for Internet defamation.

One problem we had to overcome in order to prevail in this action was the fact that the director was so well regarded that witness after witness talked glowingly about him during the trial. That was great to show the falsity of the statements published by the defendant doctor, but it also showed that the Plaintiff had not suffered a significant loss of reputation since the witnesses still loved him. The jurors later explained that this love-fest was the reason they awarded a relatively moderate amount of compensatory damages, but during the trial this left me to wonder if they were fully appreciating the malice behind what defendant had done. Not to worry; the jury came roaring back in the punitive damages phase and made very clear with the amount of punitive damages that the defendant doctor needed to be punished for her conduct. In closing argument I had explained that cases like this actually promote freedom of speech and the marketplace of ideas that we hold so dear in America, because those ideals are not served by knowing falsity. The jury apparently agreed.

As the icing on the cake, the judge then granted our request for injunctive relief, prohibiting the doctor from defaming our client in the future.  Although each instance of defamation is actionable, repeatedly suing a serial defamer is not the best solution because of the expense and delay in getting to trial.  With an injunction from the court, the doctor can actually be jailed if she repeats her false claims about our client and is found to be in contempt of court for defying the court’s order.

posted by Aaron Morris on Aug 1

Trials are decided by humans with all their human experiences.  Whether a judge or jury is deciding a case, your relative success will depend on the nature of those experiences, and your ability to persuade the trier of fact to set them aside when appropriate.  Internet defamation cases necessarily require some understanding of the Internet by the trier of fact, or at least the willingness to absorb new concepts.  Thankfully it has not happened to me in any of the cases I have handled, but I still hear horror stories about judges who make comments like, “no one really believes anything they read on this . . . In-ter-net,” or “what is this google you keep talking about?”

At least a Small Claims Judge in Canada appears to understand a thing or two about Internet defamation.  In the case, the defendant took a disliking to a local dog kennel for whatever reason.  She visited some animal discussion boards, and posted comments about the kennel, referring to it as a “puppy mill.”  The kennel took exception to this characterization, and sued for defamation in Small Claims Court.  (In one of my earliest postings, I sing the praises of suing for defamation in Small Claims Court.  Take note how effective that can be.)

The court found in favor of the Plaintiff dog kennel, and awarded $14,000 in damages.  The court correctly determined that calling a dog kennel a “puppy mill” is a bad thing.  But what caught my eye was the simple logic of the judge, the sort of logic that sometimes alludes other judges.  First he was upset that these postings were made on the Internet, recognizing that “the use of the Internet worsens the defamation.”  That may seem extremely self-evident to most of us, but remember those aforesaid judges that still view that Internet as a fad among kids that will soon pass.  The judge also stated that the defamation was “particularly malicious” because the purpose of the defendant was to put out of business a kennel that supported a family of 11. 

Wow.  A judge that recognizes that Internet defamation can be more egregious than verbal defamation, and who views the conduct from a real world perspective of how it impacts the people behind the business.  Thank you Canada.

posted by Aaron Morris on Jul 14

Perhaps because the adrenaline and endorphins flow during a courtroom battle, I become very thoughtful in the calm that follows. I won a small but satisfying court victory today in an Internet defamation case, and it made me realize how much the process mirrors a scene from a movie I just saw.

The movie was Taken, which I thought was very good. Even if you haven’t seen the movie, you probably saw the scene to which I refer since it was shown in the trailers. The main character, who we come to learn is some sort of retired Über-spy, is on the phone with his teenage daughter when she is kidnaped. He hears the bad guy pick up the phone, and he calmly gives the following speech:

I don’t know who you are, and I don’t know what you want.
If you are looking for ransom, I can tell you I don’t have money.
But what I do have are a very particular set of skills;
skills I have acquired over a very long career.
Skills that make me a nightmare for people like you.
If you let my daughter go now, that will be the end of it.
But if you don’t, I will look for you, I will find you and I will kill you.

Most every Internet defamation case I handle starts with such a moment. Not nearly so dramatic, of course, and there are no deaths involved if the defendant doesn’t listen to me, but the concept of a choice is the same.

Most of my defamation clients aren’t seeking money initially; they just want the bad guy to stop defaming them. My marching orders are usually just to get the person to take down the comments. So I write to the bad guy, explaining that this does not need to go any further. He strayed from the path and said and did some things he shouldn’t have, but if he just takes down the posts and walks away, “that will be the end of it.”

That is the moment in time. I am affording the prospective defendant the opportunity to avoid sending his life in a bad direction. I am less of an advocate and more of a care giver, just trying to convince the patient to stop engaging in self-destructive behavior. But he makes the ultimate decision whether to accept that help, or to continue on his path.

In Taken, the kidnapper could not help himself and responded by saying, “good luck.” He did not take the skill set seriously enough, thinking he would be impossible to find. Today’s defendant also did not take the skill set seriously enough, thinking since he lived across the country we would never pursue him. He was one of a few on-line competitors with my client, and had engaged in some trash-talking that escalated into defamatory comments about my client’s business practices. All he had to do was take down the false statements and walk away and that would have been the end of it. He refused, and today a judge ordered him to take down the false statements, and to pay my client over $200,000.

Pick your battles. If you want to take on a plaintiff that you feel is trying to shake you down, then I’m with you one hundred percent. But don’t get into a court battle just to prove who has the bigger . . . lawyer. The defendant in today’s case had no moral high ground. He knew what he was saying about my client was untrue, so why on earth wouldn’t he take the opportunity to walk away? As a famous philosopher once sang, “You’ve got to know when to hold them, know when to fold them.”

posted by Aaron Morris on Jul 7

Even when a lawsuit is weak on merit it sometimes achieves its purpose.  I will have no part in filing a meritless lawsuit, but sometimes it is appropriate to push the envelope.

Take the case of Tony La Russa, famous baseball manager.  Like so many other well known people, someone hijacked his name and image on Twitter, leading many “followers” to believe that the musings coming from this Twitterer (Twitterite?) were coming from the real deal.  La Russa tried to persuade Twitter to intervene and remove the fake identity, but sure as there is a fail whale, the fine folks at Twitter refused to cooperate.

La Russa filed suit and got a lot of grief for doing so, with most legal experts citing the Communications Decency Act (CDA) as a barrier to the suit.  But, obviously, this is not a typical CDA situation.  Yes, La Russa was seeking to hold Twitter liable for the “postings” of third parties, and that is classic CDA material.  But there are some interesting side issues.  For example, a website cannot encourage visitors to post copyrighted e-books for download and then expect to escape liability under the CDA because third parties are the ones actually posting the books.  In that case, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act would trump the CDA.  Like a copyright, people have a pecuniary interest in there own identities.  Should Twitter be permitted to assist in those that would steal that identity?

The La Russa case will not be providing any answers to this question, because it has been withdrawn, but not before Twitter deleted the offending account.  Most are reporting this story as a victory for Twitter, but didn’t La Russa get exactly what he asked for in the first place?

For more on this story, go here.

posted by Aaron Morris on Jun 20

Another blogger learned this week that you are judged by what you say.

Tara Richerson is a teacher in Washington. She had been blogging since 2004 and many of her postings were about her job. According to court records, when she was demoted from her position as a coach at the school, she wrote the following missive:

“Save us White Boy! I met with the new me today: the person who will take my summer work and make it a full-time year-round position. … But after spending time with this guy today, I think Boss Lady 2.0 made the wrong call in hiring him. … He comes across as a smug know-it-all creep. And that’s probably the nicest way I can describe him. … And he’s white. And male. I know he can’t help that, but I think the District would have done well to recruit someone who has other connections to the community. … Mighty White Boy looks like he’s going to crash and burn.”

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Richerson’s blog contained “several highly personal and vituperative comments” that justified the Central Kitsap School District’s decision to transfer her from her job as a curriculum specialist and instructional coach to a classroom teaching position. The court found that Richerson’s speech was disruptive, eroded work relationships and interfered with her job performance, which involved mentoring teachers.

“Common sense indicates that few teachers would expect that they could enter into a confidential and trusting relationship with Richerson after reading her blog,” the court wrote in its Tuesday opinion. “Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the legitimate administrative interests of the school district outweighed Richerson’s First Amendment interests.” The court ruled that Richerson’s blog attacking co-workers, the union and the school district was not protected speech, and therefore she was not unlawfully demoted over it.

According to court records, Richerson was transferred out of her coaching job in July 2007 after school officials discovered her blog months earlier. Another of the blog entries that Richerson came under fire for was one entry in which she allegedly attacked a teacher and union negotiator, who complained to school officials about it. It read: “What I wouldn’t give to draw a little Hitler mustache on the chief negotiator.”

The lesson to learn is that you can and will be held accountable for the things you say. Even if your comments do not cross the line into defamation, they may still be considered inappropriate for other reasons. It is disingenuous for people like Richerson to cry foul and cite the First Amendment when they are held responsible for their own comments. The First Amendment does not state that you can say whatever you want with no fear of repercussion. If someone feels strongly enough about an alleged wrong to blog about it, then they should be willing to stand by those convictions.

posted by Aaron Morris on Jun 17

I’ve explained here several times that the Communications Decency Act is a necessary evil because you could never have open forums for discussion on the Internet if the operators of the websites were required to read and approve every message posted. Perhaps the Amazons of the world would have the resources to hire a huge staff to monitor all postings, but any popular discussion site that started to attract thousands of visitors would likely be required to stop offering a public forum if it became responsible for the things posted by visitors.

Some attorneys still don’t understand this reality. Take the case of Richard M. Berman. Poor Richard was shot by someone using a handgun purchased from a for sale ad posted on Craigslist. He hired attorney Paul B. Dalnocky, who sued Craigslist for more than $10 million, claiming it was responsible for the handgun ending up in the bad guy’s hands. The civil complaint alleged Craigslist “is either unable or unwilling to allocate the necessary resources to monitor, police, maintain and properly supervise the goods and services” sold on its site. When interviewed for an article on Law.com, attorney Dalnocky said, “We weren’t seeing Craigslist as a publisher — we were seeing it as a regular business that should have monitored its business better. I mean, how can you run a business with millions of ads and have only 25 employees monitoring it?”

No, Mr. Dalnocky, the question is, how would a service like Craigslist be possible if attorneys could sue for things posted in those millions of ads? The answer is it wouldn’t be possible. You allege “millions” of ads are posted on Craigslist. Let’s assume a person could review 1000 ads during a work day. That’s probably not realistic, because that means the person would need to review more than two ads per minute (assuming an eight-hour work day with two 15 minute breaks). Some ads go on for pages so I don’t think one could really review more than two ads per minute, but let’s go with 1000 just to keep the numbers simple. Thus, Craigslist would need to hire 1000 employees for every one million ads posted. It’s going to be very difficult for old Craig to maintain his business model that permits me to post free ads for my 8-track tapes if he is required to hire thousands of employees.

And, Mr. Dalnocky, what would those thousands of employees be looking for, exactly? Guns can be legally sold, and I did not see anything in the court’s decision about any alleged illegality of the gun sale in question. Rather, your complaint alleged that Craigslist was liable because it breached its “duty of care to ensure that inherently hazardous objects, such as handguns, did not come into the hands of . . . individuals, such as Mr. Ortiz.” (Ortiz was alleged to have shot Richard Berman.)  What, in that ad, would have put the reviewer on notice that this gun sale was going to end badly?

The attorney representing Craigslist is no doubt a subscriber to the Internet Defamation Blog, and therefore knew that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is not limited only to claims for defamation. Craigslist moved for dismissal under §230, which states that no “provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” and that no “cause of action may be brought and liability imposed under any State law that is inconsistent with this section.”

The court properly dismissed the case under the CDA because, let’s say it all together, a website operator cannot be held liable for comments (or ads) posted by third parties, and is not liable for failing to somehow monitor those comments (or ads).  One of the earliest cases involving the CDA was an action against Ebay.  Someone sued, claiming that Ebay should be held liable for the counterfeit items that were being posted and sold, trying to impose on it an obligation to review and investigate every ad.  Ebay prevailed in that action, and Craigslist properly prevailed in this one.

The full court decision can be found here.

posted by Aaron Morris on May 9

A recent decision by the California Court of Appeal, which reverses a trial court’s decision to dismiss the underlying defamation case, beautifully illustrates how trial courts still do not understand the anti-SLAPP statute. It’s unfortunate the plaintiff had to go through an appeal in order to educate this particular judge. The following summary of facts and quotes are taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. I apologize for the long post and multiple citations, but I want to have a place where people can be directed for the proper anti-SLAPP considerations and standards.

The action appears to have roots going back to 2003, when there was an altercation between Rabbi Chaim Seidler-Feller, Director of Hillel at UCLA, and Rachel Neuwirth, a journalist working in the Los Angeles area. Neuwirth alleged that Seidler-Feller had attacked her without provocation in October 2003. Shortly after this attack, she alleges in her complaint, “disciples of Seidler-Feller maintained in public print that [she] had provoked the attack by making inc[e]ndiary statements” to him. Neuwirth denied these allegations. As a result of her injuries, she said, she sought legal redress and reached an “amicable settlement” with Seidler-Feller and Hillel accompanied by a letter of apology from Seidler-Feller, “published in various tribunals,” in which he “acknowledged that the attack upon [Neuwirth] was unprovoked, that he took full responsibility for said attack and apologized for his actions.”

The complaint further alleges that notwithstanding Seidler-Feller’s admissions, “in an effort to vilify and damage [Neuwirth’s] reputation further,” someone named Richard Silverstein published on the Internet a statement which “in effect called [Neuwirth] a liar” and took the position that Neuwirth had, in fact, provoked the attack and that Seidler-Feller’s “original version” was more credible than Neuwirth’s. Later, on May 3, 2007, Silverstein published on the Internet an article in which he referred to Neuwirth as “a ‘Kahanist swine’ thereby accusing [her] of being a member of a terrorist organization” and exposing her to hatred, contempt and ridicule and injuring her in her occupation in violation of Civil Code section 45. “The United States Department of State has issued . . . a list of terrorist organizations which include such organizations as Al-Qaida, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Kahane Chai, among others. To refer to a person as a Kahanist is to brand that person as a terrorist.” Silverstein knew his publication was false, and it constituted libel per se, she said.

On May 13, Neuwirth alleged (in her second cause of action), Joel Beinin joined the fray and published on the Internet a statement falsely accusing her of having made a death threat against him. At the same time, Silverstein issued another statement on the Internet reiterating the allegation Neuwirth had made a death threat against Beinin, although Silverstein knew the statement to be false. Accusing her of committing this crime, she alleged, also constituted libel per se under Civil Code section 45.

In response to Neuwirth’s complaint, both Silverstein and Beinin filed anti-SLAPP motions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) In his motion, Silverstein asserted Neuwirth’s complaint arose from speech in a public forum regarding an issue of public interest as both he and Neuwirth write about the “Middle East conflict—a highly controversial matter of great public importance and political interest.” He attached copies of the statements to his declaration. Because he has chosen to advocate tolerance and peaceful reconciliation, he said, his “work has attracted vitriolic criticism from those who, unlike him, believe that Arabs and Jews should not live together.” For his part, Beinin basically argued that the claim of a death threat was true and protected on a number of grounds.

In a 28-page ruling, the trial court granted both special motions to strike and subsequently entered judgment in favor of both Silverstein and Beinin. While the defendants proclaimed their victory, Neuwirth filed her appeal.

Analysis for an anti-SLAPP motion.

A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) “seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055.) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, was enacted as “a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (Id. at pp. 1055-1056.) In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court first determines whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action “arises from protected activity.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056.)

In the Neuwirth case, the trial court properly concluded that the comments alleged to be defamatory were at least arguably protected speech. But “protected speech” does not mean that the speech is immune from prosecution, and that is the distinction that appears to baffle many judges. Defamatory speech is never protected.* “Protected” simply means that it is subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The second part of the analysis still remains.

“[O]nce the defendant establishes the challenged cause of action . . . arise[s] out of the exercise of petition or free expression rights, the burden shifts to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must then establish a probability that he or she will prevail on the merits. . . . The Supreme Court has defined the probability of prevailing burden as follows: ‘[T]he plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’” (Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 537.)

“For purposes of this inquiry, ‘the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ . . . In making this assessment it is ‘the court’s responsibility … to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff … .’ [Citation.] The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ . . . to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Ibid., citations and footnote omitted; see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 ["the anti-SLAPP statute requires only ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability’ [citation]“], quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 438, fn. 5.)

“Section 425.16 does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning. It subjects to potential dismissal only those causes of action as to which the plaintiff is unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits (§ 425.16, subd. (b)), a provision we have read as ‘requiring the court to determine only if the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim’ (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 [58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061] (Rosenthal)). So construed, ‘section 425.16 provides an efficient means of dispatching, early on in a lawsuit, [and discouraging, insofar as fees may be shifted,] a plaintiff’s meritless claims.’” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63.) “The purpose of section 425.16 is not to prevent lawsuits that arise from the exercise of constitutional rights, but it is to deter frivolous and improperly motivated lawsuits arising from those rights.[] Section 425.16 provides a ‘fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal’ of frivolous claims that are subject to the statute.” (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089, citation and footnote omitted.)

Plaintiff’s claims must be taken as true.

The anti-SLAPP system fails when judges cannot make the distinction between the two parts of the analysis and engage in a weighing process. For example, assuming Neuwirth is a public figure, then she would need to show malice in the comments that were made about her. But in noting the obvious, the Court of Appeal stated that said malice could be inferred from the comment “Kahanist swine.” Some courts appear to believe that malice must be shown by some extrinsic evidence of evil intent, when in fact that proof can be taken from the words themselves.

If, in turn, there was a dispute over the meaning of that term (defendant claimed it was harmless), then the interpretation offered by plaintiff must be taken as true (who said it amounted to calling someone a terrorist). The standard is akin to that of a motion for summary judgment, where the motion must be denied if there is any material issue of fact. In other words, in determining whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed with the defamation claim, the standard is, “can the plaintiff succeed IF her evidence is believed?”, not “can her evidence overcome that being claimed by defendant?”. After all, the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion stops the discovery process, so it is to be expected that a plaintiff may have minimal evidence at that point.

The complete opinion can be found here.

_______________________________

* Defamatory speech is never protected, but that must be kept in context.  For example, if Joe Citizen falsely testifies during a trial that the plaintiff cheats on his taxes, Joe can never be prosecuted for defamation for that speech.  In that instance there is no defamatory speech that is being protected because the speech by definition is not defamatory. Defamation requires a false, unprivileged statement. Comments made in court are privileged, and hence the statement cannot constitute defamation.

posted by Aaron Morris on Apr 11

The following Internet defamation case is illustrative of some points I have raised here and elsewhere.>

You may have heard of the Internet defamation case involving a website called AutoAdmit. Two Yale students sued a number of defendants, claiming they were defamed on the site’s message board. One of the named defendants was Anthony Ciolli. He was involved with AutoAdmit, but claimed he had nothing to do with the message board where the defamatory messages were published. The plaintiffs apparently came to agree with this contention, and voluntarily dismissed Ciolli in 2007.

Now Ciolli has turned the tables on the plaintiffs. According to an ABA Journal article, Ciolli is suing them along with their lawyers. Ciolli alleges that the negative publicity generated by the suit caused the law firm of Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge to withdraw an employment offer. He is suing for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings, abuse of process, libel, slander, false-light invasion of privacy, tortious interference with contract and unauthorized use of name or likeness, according to the story.

Anthony Ciolli

As I’ve said before, amateur attorneys will name too many defendants, thinking the more the merrier and hoping that even if someone is improperly named, some small settlement can be extracted from in exchange for a dismissal. You see this all the time in construction defect cases, where they name every subcontractor on a job, even though it is abundantly clear that some of the subs could not have possible contributed to the problems.  With the permission of my construction clients, I long ago instituted a zero-tolerance policy whereby we refused to pay any groundless settlement, no matter how small.  The risk is that you could end up going to trial when you could have escaped for, say, $5,000.   However, to date, that has never happened. 

The problem with naming too many defendants is illustrated by this case, where one of the named defendants did not go quietly into the night even though he was voluntarily dismissed.  The better method is to file against the key defendants and conduct discovery to determine if any other defendants can properly be named.  So, Ciolli may have a righteous claim that he should never have been named in the action.

But with that said, it appears that Ciolli and his counsel are making a very similar mistake by bringing too many causes of action. Let’s say a plaintiff gets creative with his pleading and sues a defendant under five causes of action. If he prevails on one or two of the causes, that means the defendant prevailed on the other three or four causes of action. The defendant can argue that he is the prevailing party, which may entitle him to costs and attorney fees. Further, the defendant can sue for malicious prosecution on those causes.

Keeping in mind that I have not reviewed the pleadings, I do not practice in the jurisdiction in question and I am relying on facts as reported by various news sources, I am still willing to predict that Ciolli will lose on five of the aforesaid causes of action.

The first major hurdle Ciolli is going to face is proving that being denied a job with a big law firm is a bad thing. If the comments by the plaintiffs truly prevented Ciolli from going down the big firm path, he should be sending fruit baskets, not suing them.  If the allegations are true, then the plaintiffs saved Ciolli from a fate of working 70-hour weeks for $37 per hour. See, Saving Adil Haq’s Career Life — and Yours, and Why Big Firms Don’t Work.

But setting the big firm aspects aside, the case appears to contain problematic causes of action.  For example, mis-naming a defendant is not an abuse of process; the process is absolutely correct, it is just against the wrong person. Further, if the comments about Ciolli by the original plaintiffs were made in the litigation context, I’m sure the jurisdiction in question will have a litigation privilege against defamation. (If the plaintiffs made the statements outside of the litigation, then Ciolli could prevail.) And while the standard may be different in Pennsylvania, in California the interference with contract action would never survive.

I hope the case goes to trial so my legal theories can be tested, but that may not happen. At this point the parties are still fighting over jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania federal judge decided that Ciolli could conduct discovery to determine whether the action satisfied jurisdictional requirements. I’ll continue to monitor the case.

posted by Aaron Morris on Mar 14

A recent decision out of Maryland illustrates the legal tension that exists between anonymous Internet defamers and those they victimize.

Someone trashed a Dunkin’ Donuts, claiming it was unsanitary and dirty. DD didn’t appreciate that comment, and sought the identity of the person who had posted the comment. In deciding whether the message board was required to disclose that information, Maryland’s highest court decided that the victim of the comments must go onto the board and basically give notice to the defamer. This gives the defamer an opportunity to protect his anonymity by removing the offending comment (although some unscrupulous sites won’t allow the person that posted the comment to take down his own message). Then the victim must persuade the court that the comments constitute defamation. Defamation is not protected speech, so the court can then require disclosure.

Don't Bite Off More Than You Can Chew

It’s a tough course for the victim, because being forced to go into the lion’s den will often only fan the flames. However, as this case makes clear, a victim may well be barred at the door if he does not have the fortitude to take that step.

For a more general discussion of the Maryland case, go to Internet Free-for-All Promises An Ongoing Test of Free Speech.  For a more detailed discussion of the legal issues, go to Maryland High Court Sets Legal Standard for Outing Online Foes.