More Judges Catching Up to the Times
Trials are decided by humans with all their human experiences. Whether a judge or jury is deciding a case, your relative success will depend on the nature of those experiences, and your ability to persuade the trier of fact to set them aside when appropriate. Internet defamation cases necessarily require some understanding of the Internet by the trier of fact, or at least the willingness to absorb new concepts. Thankfully it has not happened to me in any of the cases I have handled, but I still hear horror stories about judges who make comments like, “no one really believes anything they read on this . . . In-ter-net,” or “what is this google you keep talking about?”
At least a Small Claims Judge in Canada appears to understand a thing or two about Internet defamation. In the case, the defendant took a disliking to a local dog kennel for whatever reason. She visited some animal discussion boards, and posted comments about the kennel, referring to it as a “puppy mill.” The kennel took exception to this characterization, and sued for defamation in Small Claims Court. (In one of my earliest postings, I sing the praises of suing for defamation in Small Claims Court. Take note how effective that can be.)
The court found in favor of the Plaintiff dog kennel, and awarded $14,000 in damages. The court correctly determined that calling a dog kennel a “puppy mill” is a bad thing. But what caught my eye was the simple logic of the judge, the sort of logic that sometimes alludes other judges. First he was upset that these postings were made on the Internet, recognizing that “the use of the Internet worsens the defamation.” That may seem extremely self-evident to most of us, but remember those aforesaid judges that still view that Internet as a fad among kids that will soon pass. The judge also stated that the defamation was “particularly malicious” because the purpose of the defendant was to put out of business a kennel that supported a family of 11.
Wow. A judge that recognizes that Internet defamation can be more egregious than verbal defamation, and who views the conduct from a real world perspective of how it impacts the people behind the business. Thank you Canada.
Consider the Wisdom of Walking Away
Perhaps because the adrenaline and endorphins flow during a courtroom battle, I become very thoughtful in the calm that follows. I won a small but satisfying court victory today in an Internet defamation case, and it made me realize how much the process mirrors a scene from a movie I just saw.
The movie was Taken, which I thought was very good. Even if you haven’t seen the movie, you probably saw the scene to which I refer since it was shown in the trailers. The main character, who we come to learn is some sort of retired Über-spy, is on the phone with his teenage daughter when she is kidnaped. He hears the bad guy pick up the phone, and he calmly gives the following speech:
I don’t know who you are, and I don’t know what you want.
If you are looking for ransom, I can tell you I don’t have money.
But what I do have are a very particular set of skills;
skills I have acquired over a very long career.
Skills that make me a nightmare for people like you.
If you let my daughter go now, that will be the end of it.
But if you don’t, I will look for you, I will find you and I will kill you.
Most every Internet defamation case I handle starts with such a moment. Not nearly so dramatic, of course, and there are no deaths involved if the defendant doesn’t listen to me, but the concept of a choice is the same.
Most of my defamation clients aren’t seeking money initially; they just want the bad guy to stop defaming them. My marching orders are usually just to get the person to take down the comments. So I write to the bad guy, explaining that this does not need to go any further. He strayed from the path and said and did some things he shouldn’t have, but if he just takes down the posts and walks away, “that will be the end of it.”
That is the moment in time. I am affording the prospective defendant the opportunity to avoid sending his life in a bad direction. I am less of an advocate and more of a care giver, just trying to convince the patient to stop engaging in self-destructive behavior. But he makes the ultimate decision whether to accept that help, or to continue on his path.
In Taken, the kidnapper could not help himself and responded by saying, “good luck.” He did not take the skill set seriously enough, thinking he would be impossible to find. Today’s defendant also did not take the skill set seriously enough, thinking since he lived across the country we would never pursue him. He was one of a few on-line competitors with my client, and had engaged in some trash-talking that escalated into defamatory comments about my client’s business practices. All he had to do was take down the false statements and walk away and that would have been the end of it. He refused, and today a judge ordered him to take down the false statements, and to pay my client over $200,000.
Pick your battles. If you want to take on a plaintiff that you feel is trying to shake you down, then I’m with you one hundred percent. But don’t get into a court battle just to prove who has the bigger . . . lawyer. The defendant in today’s case had no moral high ground. He knew what he was saying about my client was untrue, so why on earth wouldn’t he take the opportunity to walk away? As a famous philosopher once sang, “You’ve got to know when to hold them, know when to fold them.”
Tony La Russa Drops Action Against Twitter
Even when a lawsuit is weak on merit it sometimes achieves its purpose. I will have no part in filing a meritless lawsuit, but sometimes it is appropriate to push the envelope.
Take the case of Tony La Russa, famous baseball manager. Like so many other well known people, someone hijacked his name and image on Twitter, leading many “followers” to believe that the musings coming from this Twitterer (Twitterite?) were coming from the real deal. La Russa tried to persuade Twitter to intervene and remove the fake identity, but sure as there is a fail whale, the fine folks at Twitter refused to cooperate.
La Russa filed suit and got a lot of grief for doing so, with most legal experts citing the Communications Decency Act (CDA) as a barrier to the suit. But, obviously, this is not a typical CDA situation. Yes, La Russa was seeking to hold Twitter liable for the “postings” of third parties, and that is classic CDA material. But there are some interesting side issues. For example, a website cannot encourage visitors to post copyrighted e-books for download and then expect to escape liability under the CDA because third parties are the ones actually posting the books. In that case, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act would trump the CDA. Like a copyright, people have a pecuniary interest in there own identities. Should Twitter be permitted to assist in those that would steal that identity?
The La Russa case will not be providing any answers to this question, because it has been withdrawn, but not before Twitter deleted the offending account. Most are reporting this story as a victory for Twitter, but didn’t La Russa get exactly what he asked for in the first place?
For more on this story, go here.
An International Context for the Single Publication Rule
I’ll return to explain the concept in more detail, but here is an article that very nicely summarizes the competing international approaches to the American Single Publication Rule.
Another Blogger Bites the Dust
Another blogger learned this week that you are judged by what you say.
Tara Richerson is a teacher in Washington. She had been blogging since 2004 and many of her postings were about her job. According to court records, when she was demoted from her position as a coach at the school, she wrote the following missive:
“Save us White Boy! I met with the new me today: the person who will take my summer work and make it a full-time year-round position. … But after spending time with this guy today, I think Boss Lady 2.0 made the wrong call in hiring him. … He comes across as a smug know-it-all creep. And that’s probably the nicest way I can describe him. … And he’s white. And male. I know he can’t help that, but I think the District would have done well to recruit someone who has other connections to the community. … Mighty White Boy looks like he’s going to crash and burn.”
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Richerson’s blog contained “several highly personal and vituperative comments” that justified the Central Kitsap School District’s decision to transfer her from her job as a curriculum specialist and instructional coach to a classroom teaching position. The court found that Richerson’s speech was disruptive, eroded work relationships and interfered with her job performance, which involved mentoring teachers.
“Common sense indicates that few teachers would expect that they could enter into a confidential and trusting relationship with Richerson after reading her blog,” the court wrote in its Tuesday opinion. “Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the legitimate administrative interests of the school district outweighed Richerson’s First Amendment interests.” The court ruled that Richerson’s blog attacking co-workers, the union and the school district was not protected speech, and therefore she was not unlawfully demoted over it.
According to court records, Richerson was transferred out of her coaching job in July 2007 after school officials discovered her blog months earlier. Another of the blog entries that Richerson came under fire for was one entry in which she allegedly attacked a teacher and union negotiator, who complained to school officials about it. It read: “What I wouldn’t give to draw a little Hitler mustache on the chief negotiator.”
The lesson to learn is that you can and will be held accountable for the things you say. Even if your comments do not cross the line into defamation, they may still be considered inappropriate for other reasons. It is disingenuous for people like Richerson to cry foul and cite the First Amendment when they are held responsible for their own comments. The First Amendment does not state that you can say whatever you want with no fear of repercussion. If someone feels strongly enough about an alleged wrong to blog about it, then they should be willing to stand by those convictions.
Communications Decency Act Shields Craigslist from Liability
I’ve explained here several times that the Communications Decency Act is a necessary evil because you could never have open forums for discussion on the Internet if the operators of the websites were required to read and approve every message posted. Perhaps the Amazons of the world would have the resources to hire a huge staff to monitor all postings, but any popular discussion site that started to attract thousands of visitors would likely be required to stop offering a public forum if it became responsible for the things posted by visitors.
Some attorneys still don’t understand this reality. Take the case of Richard M. Berman. Poor Richard was shot by someone using a handgun purchased from a for sale ad posted on Craigslist. He hired attorney Paul B. Dalnocky, who sued Craigslist for more than $10 million, claiming it was responsible for the handgun ending up in the bad guy’s hands. The civil complaint alleged Craigslist “is either unable or unwilling to allocate the necessary resources to monitor, police, maintain and properly supervise the goods and services” sold on its site. When interviewed for an article on Law.com, attorney Dalnocky said, “We weren’t seeing Craigslist as a publisher — we were seeing it as a regular business that should have monitored its business better. I mean, how can you run a business with millions of ads and have only 25 employees monitoring it?”
No, Mr. Dalnocky, the question is, how would a service like Craigslist be possible if attorneys could sue for things posted in those millions of ads? The answer is it wouldn’t be possible. You allege “millions” of ads are posted on Craigslist. Let’s assume a person could review 1000 ads during a work day. That’s probably not realistic, because that means the person would need to review more than two ads per minute (assuming an eight-hour work day with two 15 minute breaks). Some ads go on for pages so I don’t think one could really review more than two ads per minute, but let’s go with 1000 just to keep the numbers simple. Thus, Craigslist would need to hire 1000 employees for every one million ads posted. It’s going to be very difficult for old Craig to maintain his business model that permits me to post free ads for my 8-track tapes if he is required to hire thousands of employees.
And, Mr. Dalnocky, what would those thousands of employees be looking for, exactly? Guns can be legally sold, and I did not see anything in the court’s decision about any alleged illegality of the gun sale in question. Rather, your complaint alleged that Craigslist was liable because it breached its “duty of care to ensure that inherently hazardous objects, such as handguns, did not come into the hands of . . . individuals, such as Mr. Ortiz.” (Ortiz was alleged to have shot Richard Berman.) What, in that ad, would have put the reviewer on notice that this gun sale was going to end badly?
The attorney representing Craigslist is no doubt a subscriber to the Internet Defamation Blog, and therefore knew that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is not limited only to claims for defamation. Craigslist moved for dismissal under §230, which states that no “provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” and that no “cause of action may be brought and liability imposed under any State law that is inconsistent with this section.”
The court properly dismissed the case under the CDA because, let’s say it all together, a website operator cannot be held liable for comments (or ads) posted by third parties, and is not liable for failing to somehow monitor those comments (or ads). One of the earliest cases involving the CDA was an action against Ebay. Someone sued, claiming that Ebay should be held liable for the counterfeit items that were being posted and sold, trying to impose on it an obligation to review and investigate every ad. Ebay prevailed in that action, and Craigslist properly prevailed in this one.
The full court decision can be found here.
Mistaken Reporting Does Not Amount to Actual Malice
Ozzy Osbourne
A case indirectly involving Ozzy “Bark at the Moon” Osbourne affords me another opportunity to illustrate what a legal minefield a defamation case can present.
The case arose from statements made about Osbourne’s former physician, Dr. David Kipper. The New York Times published a story which included Osborne’s allegations that his former physician had overprescribed medication to him during his appearance on the MTV reality series “The Osbornes.” In that same article, the Times reported that the Medical Board had “moved to revoke” Dr. Kipper’s license.
The New York Post published a condensed version of the Time’s article, but during the summary process stated instead that the doctor’s license had been revoked. Under normal circumstances that would certainly constitute defamation, but let’s test your legal prowess. Do you see the problem? What if I tell you that Dr. Kipper is a public figure; now do you see the problem?
In order to prevail in his case against the Post, Kipper had to prove “[New York Times] actual malice.” He had the burden of showing that the Post had knowledge that the statement was false or made the statement with reckless disregard for whether it was true.
The post brought a motion for summary judgment which was denied, but the appellate court reversed and ordered the case dismissed. The justice wrote, “Other than the fact that the rewrite contains erroneous statements, there is no evidence that anyone at the Post set out to falsely defame plaintiff in this instance, or other individuals regularly, to increase its sales.”
Illinois Case May Provide Crack in Communications Decency Act
Speedskater Shani Davis
I think there is little doubt that someday a court will permit a circumvention of the Communications Decency Act. As explained here numerous time, the CDA makes a website or website provider immune from liability for content posted by others. But there are constant skirmishes at the fringe. For example, if the website somehow “highlights” the posting or adds its own editorial comments, does it then become responsible for the content? What if a court orders the poster to remove the defamatory content, but the site refuses to cooperate in the process? Can’t the argument then be made that the website operator is then publishing the content since the original poster has disowned it? And while the CDA contemplates that the original poster will be responsible for the defamatory content, what if the person who posted the content dies and the victim is left with no remedy?
This last hypothetical is precisely the issue that is presented by a case currently pending in Illinois. The mother of US Olympic speedskater Shani Davis is suing Google for refusing to remove a blog posting that was made by a user who has since died. There is no doubt that under normal circumstances, Google would be protected from immunity under the CDA. But the blogger, Sean Healy, died of cancer a year after publishing the article in question.
The post by Healy was entitled, “Memo to Cherie Davis,” and claims that the speedskater’s mother made disparaging comments about the views of the US Speedskating Federation. Cherie Davis claims in her suit that she made no such comment. She further claims that because Healy cannot be made to answer in damages and/or remove the content, Google must step up and make things right with this now dormant blog, that just sits on Google’s server, continuing to defame plaintiff.
I’m hopeful that this will be the case that opens a tiny crack in the CDA. I applaud the CDA for protecting websites from liability. As I have explained here before, if website operators became liable for the content posted by others, none could risk having a public discussion board. But I always contended that the open marketplace of ideas can still exist even if we make website operators subject to cooperating with court orders. If a court finds that content is defamatory, there is no reason that a site should fight to maintain that content. The website will be protected by the necessity of a plaintiff having to go to court to have that determination made. Website operators contend even that is too onerous, since they will then have to remove the content, but this is belied by the fact that website hosts, including Google, already comply with demands made under the DMCA to remove copyrighted material.
I’ll keep you posted on the results of this case.
Trial Judges Still Struggling With Application of Anti-SLAPP
A recent decision by the California Court of Appeal, which reverses a trial court’s decision to dismiss the underlying defamation case, beautifully illustrates how trial courts still do not understand the anti-SLAPP statute. It’s unfortunate the plaintiff had to go through an appeal in order to educate this particular judge. The following summary of facts and quotes are taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. I apologize for the long post and multiple citations, but I want to have a place where people can be directed for the proper anti-SLAPP considerations and standards.
The action appears to have roots going back to 2003, when there was an altercation between Rabbi Chaim Seidler-Feller, Director of Hillel at UCLA, and Rachel Neuwirth, a journalist working in the Los Angeles area. Neuwirth alleged that Seidler-Feller had attacked her without provocation in October 2003. Shortly after this attack, she alleges in her complaint, “disciples of Seidler-Feller maintained in public print that [she] had provoked the attack by making inc[e]ndiary statements” to him. Neuwirth denied these allegations. As a result of her injuries, she said, she sought legal redress and reached an “amicable settlement” with Seidler-Feller and Hillel accompanied by a letter of apology from Seidler-Feller, “published in various tribunals,” in which he “acknowledged that the attack upon [Neuwirth] was unprovoked, that he took full responsibility for said attack and apologized for his actions.”
The complaint further alleges that notwithstanding Seidler-Feller’s admissions, “in an effort to vilify and damage [Neuwirth’s] reputation further,” someone named Richard Silverstein published on the Internet a statement which “in effect called [Neuwirth] a liar” and took the position that Neuwirth had, in fact, provoked the attack and that Seidler-Feller’s “original version” was more credible than Neuwirth’s. Later, on May 3, 2007, Silverstein published on the Internet an article in which he referred to Neuwirth as “a ‘Kahanist swine’ thereby accusing [her] of being a member of a terrorist organization” and exposing her to hatred, contempt and ridicule and injuring her in her occupation in violation of Civil Code section 45. “The United States Department of State has issued . . . a list of terrorist organizations which include such organizations as Al-Qaida, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Kahane Chai, among others. To refer to a person as a Kahanist is to brand that person as a terrorist.” Silverstein knew his publication was false, and it constituted libel per se, she said.
On May 13, Neuwirth alleged (in her second cause of action), Joel Beinin joined the fray and published on the Internet a statement falsely accusing her of having made a death threat against him. At the same time, Silverstein issued another statement on the Internet reiterating the allegation Neuwirth had made a death threat against Beinin, although Silverstein knew the statement to be false. Accusing her of committing this crime, she alleged, also constituted libel per se under Civil Code section 45.
In response to Neuwirth’s complaint, both Silverstein and Beinin filed anti-SLAPP motions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) In his motion, Silverstein asserted Neuwirth’s complaint arose from speech in a public forum regarding an issue of public interest as both he and Neuwirth write about the “Middle East conflict—a highly controversial matter of great public importance and political interest.” He attached copies of the statements to his declaration. Because he has chosen to advocate tolerance and peaceful reconciliation, he said, his “work has attracted vitriolic criticism from those who, unlike him, believe that Arabs and Jews should not live together.” For his part, Beinin basically argued that the claim of a death threat was true and protected on a number of grounds.
In a 28-page ruling, the trial court granted both special motions to strike and subsequently entered judgment in favor of both Silverstein and Beinin. While the defendants proclaimed their victory, Neuwirth filed her appeal.
Analysis for an anti-SLAPP motion.
A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) “seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055.) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, was enacted as “a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (Id. at pp. 1055-1056.) In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court first determines whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action “arises from protected activity.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056.)
In the Neuwirth case, the trial court properly concluded that the comments alleged to be defamatory were at least arguably protected speech. But “protected speech” does not mean that the speech is immune from prosecution, and that is the distinction that appears to baffle many judges. Defamatory speech is never protected.* “Protected” simply means that it is subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The second part of the analysis still remains.
“[O]nce the defendant establishes the challenged cause of action . . . arise[s] out of the exercise of petition or free expression rights, the burden shifts to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must then establish a probability that he or she will prevail on the merits. . . . The Supreme Court has defined the probability of prevailing burden as follows: ‘[T]he plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’” (Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 537.)
“For purposes of this inquiry, ‘the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ . . . In making this assessment it is ‘the court’s responsibility … to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff … .’ [Citation.] The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ . . . to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Ibid., citations and footnote omitted; see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 ["the anti-SLAPP statute requires only ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability’ [citation]“], quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 438, fn. 5.)
“Section 425.16 does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning. It subjects to potential dismissal only those causes of action as to which the plaintiff is unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits (§ 425.16, subd. (b)), a provision we have read as ‘requiring the court to determine only if the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim’ (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 [58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061] (Rosenthal)). So construed, ‘section 425.16 provides an efficient means of dispatching, early on in a lawsuit, [and discouraging, insofar as fees may be shifted,] a plaintiff’s meritless claims.’” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63.) “The purpose of section 425.16 is not to prevent lawsuits that arise from the exercise of constitutional rights, but it is to deter frivolous and improperly motivated lawsuits arising from those rights.[] Section 425.16 provides a ‘fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal’ of frivolous claims that are subject to the statute.” (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089, citation and footnote omitted.)
Plaintiff’s claims must be taken as true.
The anti-SLAPP system fails when judges cannot make the distinction between the two parts of the analysis and engage in a weighing process. For example, assuming Neuwirth is a public figure, then she would need to show malice in the comments that were made about her. But in noting the obvious, the Court of Appeal stated that said malice could be inferred from the comment “Kahanist swine.” Some courts appear to believe that malice must be shown by some extrinsic evidence of evil intent, when in fact that proof can be taken from the words themselves.
If, in turn, there was a dispute over the meaning of that term (defendant claimed it was harmless), then the interpretation offered by plaintiff must be taken as true (who said it amounted to calling someone a terrorist). The standard is akin to that of a motion for summary judgment, where the motion must be denied if there is any material issue of fact. In other words, in determining whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed with the defamation claim, the standard is, “can the plaintiff succeed IF her evidence is believed?”, not “can her evidence overcome that being claimed by defendant?”. After all, the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion stops the discovery process, so it is to be expected that a plaintiff may have minimal evidence at that point.
The complete opinion can be found here.
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* Defamatory speech is never protected, but that must be kept in context. For example, if Joe Citizen falsely testifies during a trial that the plaintiff cheats on his taxes, Joe can never be prosecuted for defamation for that speech. In that instance there is no defamatory speech that is being protected because the speech by definition is not defamatory. Defamation requires a false, unprivileged statement. Comments made in court are privileged, and hence the statement cannot constitute defamation.
“Lying” Comment Was Not a Verifiable Fact Given Context
Tom Martino
Context is everything is everything in a defamation action.
In the recent Ninth Circuit case of Gardner v. Martino, plaintiffs sold a new boat from their showroom. The buyer of the boat claimed the boat was defective, and went onto a radio show to talk about the failure of the plaintiffs to address the problems. During the show, the host, Tom Martino, listened to the complaints of the buyers and commented that the sellers were “lying” when they claimed that they had tested the boat after performing certain repairs.
The plaintiffs/sellers took umbrage with that remark, and sued Martino, the radio station and the production company for defamation. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, claiming the statement was merely an opinion and therefore could not constitute defamation. The trial court agreed with defendants and ruled that as a matter of law the comments did not constitute defamation. Under the anti-SLAPP statute, plaintiffs were ordered to pay all of defendants’ attorney fees.
I have commented here before that far too many attorneys think they can take on a defamation action, treating it like any other tort claim. This case illustrates what can happen when the attorney does not fully understand all the nuances of free speech and defamation. No doubt when the attorney was told the radio host called the plaintiffs “liars” that was viewed as an automatic case of defamation. And, in fact, in most cases calling someone a liar would constitute defamation. But here, the attorney apparently failed to consider the context of the statement.
A true opinion cannot constitute defamation unless it is offered as an assertion of fact. While it was true that the radio program host accused the plaintiffs of “lying” to their customer, that could not seriously be taken as an assertion of fact given the context of the show. As the court observed, “The Tom Martino Show is a radio talk show program that contains many of the elements that would reduce the audiences’ expectation of leaning an objective fact: drama, hyperbolic language, an opinionated and arrogant host and heated controversy. In the context of the show, Martino was simply listening to the complaint of a caller, and possessed no independent knowledge of the facts beyond what he was being told. It could not be taken, in that context, that he intended his “lying” comment to be taken as a verifiable fact.
The two corporate defendants in this case were Westwood One and Clear Channel Communications, both huge companies. No doubt these communication giants hired big firms that billed hundreds of hours at $650 per hour. Now the plaintiffs, who felt hurt by being attacked on the radio and just wanted to clear their reputations, are on the hook for perhaps $100,000 in legal fees.
I am all in favor of taking steps to defend your reputation – it’s what I do – but proceed with caution with an attorney that really knows this area of the law.
