Defamation Solutions

Steve Wynn Wins Big in Defamation Action Against Joe Francis

Defamation by Joe FrancisCan you say, “self-destructive behavior”?

Joe Francis is infamous as the creator of the “Girls Gone Wild” video series. He is unprecedented in his ability to sabotage his life.

The most recent example came down today in the form of a $7.5 million damage award against Francis and in favor of Steve Wynn and Wynn Las Vegas. This part is speculation, but I’m guessing that he lost some money at Wynn’s casino (he did, in fact, run up a $2 million debt to the resort, but I don’t know if that was from gambling), and convinced himself that the casino was cheating him. Back to the facts, he began telling tales of how Wynn deceives his high-end customers.

Wynn didn’t like the implication that he was a cheater, and sued Francis for defamation way back in 2008. That litigation finally concluded yesterday, with the judge determining that Wynn had suffered five million in compensatory damages, and also awarded $2.5 million in punitive damages.

Defamation actions are not only about the money. You clear your name through a defamation action by putting the claims on trial. In other words, Francis claimed Wynn was a cheat, Wynn said he wasn’t, and the trial determines who is telling the truth.

Defamation Case Victory for Steve Wynn

Therefore, Steve Wynn now has a judicial determination that the claims by Joe Francis were false. If Wynn’s attorneys did their jobs, they should have also obtained an injunction preventing Francis from ever again claiming Wynn cheated him. (That’s what I always do here in California, but Nevada could have different laws in that regard.) By creating that order, Francis can be held in contempt and put in jail if he continues to tell his tales.

This $7.5 million judgment is on top of the $2 million plus interest and fees Francis already owes to Wynn Las Vegas as determined by the Nevada District Court in 2009.

The typical response by a defamation defendant under these circumstances will be to appeal, probably claiming that he could not put on a proper defense because the court denied his outrageous discovery requests or something.

Calling Someone a Liar is Defamatory, Judge

Defamation on the Internet Calling Someone a Liar
I run into this attitude from judges occasionally. Thankfully, I’ve always been able to turn them around, but when I read about it, it still raises my hackles a little.

The attitude of which I speak was most recently illustrated by a New York judge named Harold Baer. The case involved a couple of former girlfriends of Matthew Couloute Jr., a New York Lawyer. The women went to the website LiarsCheatersRUs.com and allegedly posted bad comments about Couloute. (One denies making the posts, the other says they were truthful.)

If the comments had been limited to statements about how he was a cheap date or a lousy kisser, I would defend to the death their right to say such things. But as is often the case, someone who is mad enough to go to such a hate site is someone who wants to inflict pain, so they stray far afield. One of the women allegedly posted the comment, “He is very, very manipulating, he’s an attorney so he’s great at lying and covering it up without batting an eye.”

Stating someone is a liar in not automatically defamatory. As with all defamation cases, context is everything.  It usually comes down to whether the statement, in context, conveys a factual imputation of specific dishonest conduct capable of being proved false (see generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1, 18–20), and may be actionable depending on the tenor and context of the statement (Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1000–1001).

In Milkovich, for example, the plaintiff could maintain a defamation action for a newspaper opinion column branding him as a liar because the article implied that he had committed perjury in a particular case, and the alleged falsity of the charge could be determined “on a core of objective evidence.” (Id. at p. 21, 110 S.Ct. 2695.) However, “ ‘rhetorical hyperbole,’ ‘vigorous epithet[s],’ ‘lusty and imaginative expression[s] of … contempt,’ and language used ‘in a loose, figurative sense’ have all been accorded constitutional protection.” (Ferlauto v. Hamsher (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)

Thus, calling someone a liar was not actionable in Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 280, where the statement was made in a heated oral exchange during a chance encounter of opponents in a political campaign. In those circumstances, the charge was one that “no reasonable person would [have] take[n] literally,” and was “the type of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language that is constitutionally protected.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in Standing Committee v. Yagman (9th Cir.1995) 55 F.3d 1430, 1440, an attorney could not be disciplined for calling a judge “dishonest” because the word was only “one in a string of colorful adjectives” used in a letter that “together … convey[ed] nothing more substantive than [the attorney’s] contempt” In context, the word could not “reasonably be construed as suggesting that [the judge] had committed specific illegal acts,” and was thus mere “rhetorical hyperbole, incapable of being proved true or false.” (Ibid; Carver v. Bonds, 135 Cal. App. 4th 328, 346 (2005).)

Back to the statements made about Couloute.

The statement “great at lying” states not only that he has lied, but that he had lied on multiple occasions to the point that he is great at it. The “without batting an eye” comment means that he has no compunction against lying, so that is a slam on his ethics.

I would have argued that the statements are specific enough to be provably false. Indeed, I had this specific circumstance where the defendant stated that my client “lies to all his customers.” I simply put the defendant on the stand and asked him to identify every customer to whom my client had lied. He was unable to identify a single customer, so the statement was verifiably false, and the court found in our favor.

In this case, I think the same approach would have carried the day. The defendants posted, “he’s an attorney so he’s great at lying and covering it up without batting an eye.” It is the attack on his professionalism that makes the difference. I would have put them on the stand and asked them to identify every instance of a lie that he has covered up.

But here was the judge’s reasoning for throwing out this case out of New York:

“The average reader would know that the comments are ’emotionally charged rhetoric’ and the ‘opinions of disappointed lovers.'”

With all due respect Judge (Judges hate it when you say that), that does not make the comments non-defamatory. Yes, the circumstances of a statement can dictate whether the statement was meant to be taken as true, but you don’t get to call someone a liar and get a pass because the reader knows you were mad when you said it. The circumstance that allows you to get away with calling someone a liar is if the reader would know that you simply don’t have sufficient knowledge to know whether someone is a liar, as illustrated by another case I wrote about.

Now, again, context is everything. If in the full article they were going on about how he was dating multiple women and lying to all of them about being exclusive, that could well move the language into the realm of being hyperbolic and not verifiably false. And in the judge’s defense, Couloute made the huge mistake of not hiring Morris & Stone to prosecute the action, and as a result it appears the law firm he did hire failed to properly plead the case. According to this article, the judge “also refused to let Couloute revise his suit to include charges of defamation.” Thus it appears that Couloute’s attorney was trying to prosecute the case under an interference with prospective economic advantage claim. That is supported by another statement in the article, that the judge said “Couloute failed to prove the women were using their words to poison clients against him.”

The moral of the story? Know that when you sue for defamation, depending on the judge, you can run into some very provincial attitudes.

Australian Defamation Case Illustrates Life Without the CDA

Internet Defamation on Twitter

"That J-Lo, she be crazy!"

I have frequently written here on the pros and cons of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). Without it, no website could permit comments, but by the same token it allows unscrupulous website operators to encourage defamatory postings, and then use those postings to extort payments from the victims.

Because of the latter reality, many have suggested to me that they would like to see the CDA abolished. But a case out of Australia demonstrates just how ridiculous things get without the CDA.

Those Australians are people of few words, so I had to read a number of news accounts to piece together what had occurred. A blogger by the name of Marieke Hardy apparently picked up an anonymous on-line bully. For undisclosed reasons, Hardy decided that she had determined the identity of her mystery bully, so she posted the following comment on Twitter:

“I name and shame my ‘anonymous’ internet bully. Liberating business! Join me.”

The “tweet” then provided a link back to her blog, and there on the blog she identified Joshua Meggitt as the bully. Problem was, Meggitt was not the bully.

Meggitt sued for defamation. Hardy settled with him, allegedly for around $15,000. But Meggitt wants more. Meggitt is suing Twitter for defamation for the tweet by Hardy.

Do you see how absurd things quickly become without the CDA? If Twitter is responsible for every comment, then to avoid defamation it would have to put a delay on all comments, and hire thousands of employees to review the comments. As each comment passed in front of the reviewer, he or she would need to make a quick decision about whether that comment could possible be defamatory, and only then clear it for publication.

I want you to imagine that scenario. You are one of the Twitter reviewers. Thankfully Twitter limits each tweet to 140 characters, so there is not much to review, but you must apply your best judgment to each comment to see if anyone could be offended. So up pops the following:

“That J-Lo. She be crazy.”

Do you hit the approve or disapprove button? Was the “crazy” comment meant in a good or bad sense? Even if the person making the comment meant only that the singer Jennifer Lopez is crazy good, if you approve the comment then every person in the world who goes by the name J-Lo could potentially sue for defamation, claiming that the post accuses them of having mental problems.

But the dispute between Hardy and Meggitt takes the scenario to an even more absurd level. Applying those facts to out hypothetical, what you really received was:

“That J-Lo. She be crazy. http://tinyurl.com/48y28m7″

What do you do with THAT?! Twitter requires you to review and approve or deny 120 tweets per hour. To keep your job you only have less than 30 seconds to make a decision. You quickly click on the link to see why J-Lo is crazy, and you are confronted with a four and a half minute video! Do you have to watch the entire video to make sure it contains nothing defamatory? You don’t have time for that. REJECTED!

And here, all the tweeter wanted to do was pass along a great video by J-Lo.

Under the best possible circumstances, Twitter would be relegated to approving only the most milk toast comments with no possible defamatory implication. In reality though, Twitter could not possibly exist if it could be held liable for every comment posted.

To all of you who just responded with a resounding, “Who cares about Twitter?”, that’s not really the point. I’m talking big picture here.

It will be very interesting to see how the courts in Australia handle this case.

Using Offensive anti-SLAPP Deemed Frivolous

International Anti-SLAPP motionAn international defamation action has ended up here in California. Out of the UK, Tyneside councillors (that’s the way they spell it over there) are very upset that an anonymous blogger who calls himself “Mr. Monkey” has been defaming them.

The council has backed a three-year hunt to discover the identity of Mr. Monkey, with the legal fees now exceeding six figures. So far, since they did not retain Morris & Stone, the attempts to uncover the identity of Mr. Monkey have been unsuccessful.

Enter Coun Ahmed Khan, a councillor from a rival political party. The four plaintiff councillors successfully moved to have Khan’s personal computer records disclosed, because they apparently suspected him of being Mr. Monkey. Khan denies that he is the primate in question, but has cried “enough is enough”, and wants to put an end to the search.

To that end, he brought what I can only characterize as an offensive anti-SLAPP motion (not offensive as in crude, but as in the opposite of defensive). He intervened in the San Mateo Superior Court action and filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that even though he is not Mr. Monkey, the comments of Mr. Monkey are protected and the action should therefore be dismissed.

Motion DENIED. Indeed, the court found the motion to be so frivolous that it awarded attorney fees of £40,000 to the plaintiffs. (I once obtained a judgment in Los Angeles Superior Court in British pounds. It’s worth it just to see the court clerks try to figure out how to enter it into the system and calculate interest and the like.)

Khan has now appealed the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion and the award of attorney fees. The complete story can be found here.

[Correction]  The sources upon which I was relying may have jumped the gun as to the award of attorney fees. One of the parties to the action contacted me to state that the £40,000 figure is what is being sought, but that the motion for those fees has been stayed pending the appeal.

Lawyers Must Be Careful When Sending Demand Letters Out of State

Anti-SLAPP Motion Extortion

How Metabolic sees the case

The case of Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Scott J. Ferrell, et al. is turning out to be a fascinating case on several levels, including liability considerations for attorneys and SLAPP issues. Briefly, here are the facts as set forth in a recent opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Scott J. Ferrell is an attorney practicing in Orange County, California. He apparently believes that a supplement being made by Metabolic and sold by GNC (Stemulite) is bad stuff. To that end, he sent demand letters to Metabolic and GNC in Pennsylvania and Nevada, accusing them of violating the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act by way of false advertising, and threatening to sue them (presumably in California)* if they did not stop their (allegedly) evil ways and agree to an injunction to that effect.

In California, Ferrell’s letter would likely have been determined to be part of the litigation process and therefore protected, UNLESS it was deemed to be extortion. (See Flately v. Mauro.) In California, the issue would have proved very interesting, because while Ferrell was not demanding any money, the hallmark of true extortion, the injunction he was demanding was so onerous – including a requirement that all profits be disgorged – that Metabolic claimed it would have put it out of business. Nonetheless, in California it might have been decided that the letters did not cross the line, and Ferrell would have been safe from suit.

But Ferrell’s letters were sent outside of California. In November 2009 Metabolic filed a lawsuit in Nevada State Court against Ferrell, charging extortion and racketeering based on his demand letter. Ferrell removed the case to Federal Court (I never would have done that for the reasons that follow), and then brought a motion to dismiss based upon Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, claiming that the lawsuit amounted to a SLAPP because it was suing him for engaging in litigation.

Motion DENIED. The District Court found that “Nevada’s anti-SLAPP legislation only protected communications made directly to a governmental agency and did not protect a demand letter sent to a potential defendant in litigation.” Again, as would be appropriate in California but not necessarily elsewhere, Ferrell took an immediate appeal.

Appeal DENIED. Federal courts do not like interlocutory appeals, and will find a way to reject them. The court did an in-depth review of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, and concluded there was no right of immediate review of a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. The court referred to this as a “run of the mill anti-SLAPP motion” (ouch), and held that a District Court judge affords sufficient safeguards to protect defendants from SLAPP actions without the added protection of an immediate appeal. However, to twist the knife a little, the Ninth Circuit threw in that Ferrell could have proceeded by way of a writ of mandamus, and that it was offering “no opinion on how we might have decided” such an application had it been pursued.

Lawyer Lesson 1: Consider that when you send a demand letter out of state, you may be subjecting yourself to an action in that jurisdiction.

Lawyer Lesson 2: (And I have seen this over and over) Don’t remove a case to Federal court just because you can. The motion may well have been decided the same way in State court, but I would not have wanted it decided there.

* That’s not me presuming, the court opinion used those words.

With Anonymous Posters, it is Essential to Move Quickly

Move Quickly with Your Internet Defamation Action
We were just able to help a client dodge a bullet, and the fact pattern provides a cautionary tale for all.

If you or your business is the victim of Internet defamation by an anonymous poster, and you decide to go after that person, you have many hoops to jump through to get the necessary information. Say you are being trashed on WeTrashPeople.com by an unknown person. (I just made up that name, but I’m sure someone will snatch up the URL.) Unless the site is one of the few that displays the IP address of the poster, you may have to go through three rounds of subpoenas to work your way back to the Internet Service Provider (ISP), such as Cox, Time Warner, or whomever. Complicating things, most ISPs use dynamic IP addresses. In other words, every IP address is used by different subscribers at different times. It is not enough just to know the IP address of the person who posted the lies about you, you must find out who that address was assigned to at the precise time and date the comment was posted.

And that is why you must move quickly. The ISPs all have their own policies on how long they retain that information. If you wait six months to retain counsel to go after the person who is defaming you, by the time the attorney works through the subpoena process, the essential information may be gone.

It appeared that was going to be the case with our client, who waited too long before contacting us. We traced the information all the way back to the ISP, who responded to our subpoena by stating that the information was not retained. With some additional pressing by us, the ISP revised its position and coughed up the information, but that could have been the end of the road for the client’s action.

Bottom line:  If you are the victim of defamation, and you think you want to pursue an action, move quickly. Filing an action does not mean you are committing yourself to going to court. More often than not, once we have identified the defamer, an informal resolution can be reached. On multiple occasions we have discovered that the defamer is a competing business who is posting false reviews. They are more than willing to remove the comments once they have been exposed to the light.

Britain’s ASA Announces that Restaurant Reviews May Not Be Trustworthy

Food Poisoning Internet Defamation
I found this news squib interesting because it follows the precise example I often use to explain the difference between opinion and a statement of fact, and it shows how one country is dealing with reviews posted for extortionist purposes.

First, the example. If you eat at a restaurant and later post a review that says the food tasted like poison, you are probably safe from a claim for defamation. Most would agree that your statement is mere hyperbole; that you are offering your opinion that the food tasted bad, not that you actually meant it contained poison.

On the other hand, if you say that the food did, indeed, poison you, then you’d better be able to back it up with hard evidence. The first cannot be measured – what you think poison tastes like is your opinion. The second statement can be tested, because we can see if the food that day could have led to food poisoning.

Now to the real life application. It seems that one of the latest fads in Internet extortion is for a reviewer to post a review claiming that he suffered food poisoning at a restaurant. The extortionist then offers to accept, say, $5,000 for the pain and suffering of the poisoning and, oh, incidentally, offers to take down the terrible review as well. Other times the offer to remove the post never comes, because the false allegation of food poisoning is from a competitor.

This scam has become so rampant in Great Britain that the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) has informed TripAdvisor that it can no longer claim or even imply that its restaurant reviews can be trusted. The news item added that it is not always the case that the reviewer knows he or she is publishing a falsehood. When one suffers legitimate food poisoning, they almost always blame the last place they ate, not realizing that the incubation period for a good case of food poisoning is usually one or two days, and can take as long as a week. In most cases, it is impossible to know which restaurant is responsible for the poisoning except by finding a common restaurant among a group of victims.

Even Nuns Defame; An Example of How Witness Credibility is Everything

"Notre Dame des Anges" an 1889 painting by William-Adolphe Bouguereau. (Provided photo) / AL
The report of this defamation caught my eye because of the parties involved. There is a standard joke among attorneys, that if you find yourself suing widows, orphans or nuns, your practice has probably taken a bad turn. In this case, nuns were being sued for defamation.

It started when the nuns decided to sell an old painting they had laying around. The painting was in really bad shape, not even worth hanging, but it turned out to be by a well regarded artist, William-Adolphe Bouguereau. So the nuns had it appraised by an art dealer named Mark LaSalle. Based on his appraisal, the nuns agreed to sell the painting to Mark Zaplin for $450,000. Zaplin had the painting restored to its former glory, a fact that I think is crucial to this case, and turned around and sold it for $2.15 million, netting a tidy little profit.

The nuns sued LaSalle and Zaplin under a number of theories, claiming that Zaplin had been a straw buyer, and that LaSalle was working in concert with Zaplin and had conned the Daughters of Mary by intentionally under-appraising the painting in order to buy it at a bargain price. The two Marks counter-sued for defamation, because the nuns had made these same claims to the media. (In case you’re new here, you can never sue for defamation for things said in conjunction with a lawsuit, since those statements are privileged, but you can sue if the same statements are made to the media.)

Here is the part I find interesting and the main reason for this article. The nuns had a witness. An art dealer by the name of Paul Dumont claimed to know both LaSalle and Zaplin, and testified that LaSalle had told him that they could “make a handsome profit by giving the sisters a low appraisal value of between $350,000 and $450,000 and presenting a buyer who would pay the amount of our deliberate and intentionally inaccurate appraisal.” He claimed that LaSalle had asked him to find a “money man” who would act as a straw buyer.

Wow. Pretty strong stuff. So the nuns must have won, right? Actually, they went down in flames (can I say that about nuns?). A New York jury found against them on all of their claims, and instead awarded LaSalle $250,000 for defamation against Dumont and a church Bishop, and awarded Zaplin $75,000 against Dumont for defamation. LaSalle will also recover punitive damages.

But how can that happen with a witness who is specifically corroborating the story of the fraudulent appraisal and straw buyer? And therein lies the moral of this story. Continue reading

“Stealth” SLAPP Suit Victory

One of our latest anti-SLAPP victories provides a beautiful illustration of a “stealth” SLAPP suit that the plaintiff’s attorney failed to recognize, to the great expense of his client.

In this case our (future) client’s business partner, we’ll call him Freddy Fraudster, opened a credit card account at a local bank using our client’s personal information. When our client discovered what Freddy had done, he contacted the bank and informed the personnel there that Freddy had committed fraud, and based on this report the bank closed the account and reported the matter to the police. Our client also filed a police report, and filed for a restraining order against Freddy.

Freddy was not happy. He had a long term relationship with the bank, and based on the report by our client, the bank closed his accounts and would have nothing further to do with him. Apparently thinking the best defense is a good offense, and hoping that winning the race to the courthouse might give him some leverage, Freddy filed an action against our client. He claimed that our client had authorized him to open the account, and that the report to the bank was therefore defamatory since it accused him of fraud.

Do you see why Freddy’s action in Superior Court was a SLAPP suit? Opposing counsel didn’t, but we recognized that this was a SLAPP suit and successfully brought an anti-SLAPP motion. You see, a SLAPP suit is one that tries to block a person’s right of petition. Freddy’s attorney realized that the report to the police and the application for the restraining order were protected rights of petition, but he mistakenly thought that the report to the bank, requesting that the credit card be cancelled, was not a petition for redress and therefore did not fall under the SLAPP statute because it did not involve any government agency. No doubt, he thought that by suing our client for defamation, he could make all his evil deeds go away and get back in good stead with the bank by offering to dismiss the case if our client would withdraw his remarks to the bank, court and police. Now it sounds like a SLAPP, doesn’t it?

The interpretation of the SLAPP statutes by Freddy’s attorney was far too narrow. Consider. One day you run a credit report on yourself and you find that someone has fraudulently opened a credit card in your name. What is the first thing you are going to do? Call an official government agency? You might do that eventually, but first you are going to call the credit card company and tell them to cancel the card. Thus, contacting the credit card company, or in our case the bank, is a natural part of the entire “right of petition.”

It’s very similar to the litigation privilege. I occasionally see cases where a defendant tries to sue the plaintiff and his attorney, claiming that the demand letter sent by the attorney was defamatory because it falsely claimed the defendant did something illegal. But under Civil Code section 47, anything said in conjunction with litigation is privileged and therefore not defamatory. The demand letter from the attorney takes place before legal action is ever filed, but it is still part of the litigation process.

So it was here. The report to the bank occurred before any “right of petition” was pursued with a government agency, but calling to cancel the credit card was a natural part of that process. If a plaintiff were permitted to SLAPP a defendant by focusing on the activities leading up to the actual right of petition, then the intent of the anti-SLAPP statutes would be subverted. We explained that to the court, and our motion was granted.

A Case Study in Why Litigation Can Be So Expensive

Internet Defamation Law Firm

In February of last year I wrote about the case of Paul Anka versus Anna Anka.  Paul was suing his estranged wife Anna for defamation, claiming that Anna had defamed him by stating that she had never signed a prenuptual agreement, and that any agreement he could produce would be forged.  I happened to think of that article today, and wondered what had occurred in the litigation.  A Google search revealed no updates on the matter, so I went to the court’s website to look at the docket.

As it turns out, the case was dismissed in July 2010.  Since it was filed in February, the action lasted less than seven months.  But during those seven months, 87 entries were made onto the docket.  As I went through the entries, I could see that nothing ever really happened on the case, except for fights over service, discovery, amendments to the pleadings, etc.  In other words, nothing substantive ever occurred, and ultimately Paul’s complaint and Anna’s cross-complaint were both dismissed with prejudice.

Normally, if a plaintiff loses his desire to continue with a case and dismisses it, the case is dismissed WITHOUT prejudice, meaning that if the plaintiff changes his mind, he can file the case again (assuming the statute of limitations has not passed).  When a case is dismissed WITH prejudice, that means it cannot be refiled, and is almost always an indication that the parties entered into a settlement agreement that required the action to be dismissed with prejudice.  I surmise that the parties agreed to dismiss their actions against one another as part of a divorce settlement.

I am often asked by potential clients what it will cost to prosecute a defamation action.  In response, I always apologize for having to sound like an attorney, but the answer is, “it depends on what the other side does.”  If the other side does nothing but appear in the action, then we can decide how much time we want to devote on the case.  Theoretically, you could file an action, conduct no discovery, and show up on the first day of trial to present your case.  But it seldom works that way.  As the Anka case demonstrates, a great deal of time and energy was expended on this case, just trying to get it past the pleading stage, because everything turned into a fight.

I sometimes hear the question, “how can the other side get away with this?”  The answer is, I don’t let the other side get away with anything, but ultimately it is the court that must make them behave.  For example, in the Anka docket (see link below), there was a fight over taking a deposition.  The way a deposition is supposed to work is the plaintiff sends out a notice of the time and place, and the defendant shows up at that time and place.  But what if the defendant fails to appear, or appears and fails to properly answer the questions?  Only the court can force the defendant to behave, so the plaintiff must bring the wrongdoing to the court’s attention by bringing a motion to compel the defendant to appear and answer the questions.

Thirty days later, the motion is heard, and the court orders the defendant to appear, awarding sanctions to plaintiff which seldom equal the actual cost of bringing the motion.  The deposition is set ten days later, and this time the defendant appears, but refuses to allow the deposition to be videotaped even though the notice stated that the depo would be taped.  So it’s back to court for an order compelling the defendant to go forward with the video taped deposition.  And so it goes.

Some judges finally get fed up, and will order that a discovery referee sit in on the deposition and make any necessary orders, but that is very expensive.  Alternatively, the judge will eventually strike the answer of the defendant and enter her default, but since that is such an extreme result, judges will usually require repeated violations of the court’s orders before proceeding in that manner.

Paul Anka Docket

Paul Anka Complaint

Aaron Morris

Morris & Stone, LLP

Tustin Financial Plaza
17852 17th St., Suite 201
Tustin, CA 92780

(714) 954-0700

Email Aaron Morris

View Aaron Morris, Trial Attorney and Partner at Morris & Stone, with emphasis on Free Speech and Defamation Law.

Section 6158.3 Notice

NOTICE PURSUANT TO BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6158.3: The outcome of any case will depend on the facts specific to that case. Nothing contained in any portion of this web site should be taken as a representation of how your particular case would be concluded, or even that a case with similar facts will have a similar result. The result of any case discussed herein was dependent on the facts of that case, and the results will differ if based on different facts.