Internet Defamation Blog

posted by Aaron Morris on May 23

Catherine Crier

Catherine Crier is a former Dallas District Court judge who left the bench to launch a career as a television journalist.  Crier has worked as a correspondent for Court TV and the Fox News Channel.  This week she found herself on the other side of the bench, as the plaintiff in an Internet defamation action.

Crier is upset by changes that were made to her Wikipedia page.  Specifically, some moron defamer decided it would be clever to insert information about a disbarred Texas attorney named Catherine Shelton.  The defamer simply took a published article about Shelton, changed “Shelton” to “Crier” wherever it appeared, and inserted the revised article into Crier’s listing on Wikipedia.  Wikipedia affords anyone the opportunity to edit articles, and the open marketplace is supposed to result in a fairly accurate encyclopedia entry.  However, if the person is dedicated to inserting the false information, it becomes an editing war.  No doubt Crier decided to eschew that game, and went straight to the lawsuit.

Crier has already determined the IP address of the defamer, and will now ask 162nd District Judge Lorraine A. Raggio to issue a subpoena to AT&T (the Internet service provider) ordering it to identity of the owner of the specified Internet protocol address.

Procedurally this is a pretty standard case, although the Wikipedia aspect is a little different, since that site is unique in permitting the victim of defamation to make his or her own changes to the defamer’s comments.  But I put this case here as another example of the sort of nonsensical information that finds its way onto the Internet.  We fight for a free marketplace of ideas, but who would argue that this sort of behavior should enjoy any protection?  What possible motivation could the defamer have had for posting this falsified article, other than to spread malicious misinformation?

Crier’s petition can be found here.

posted by Aaron Morris on May 10

Speedskater Shani Davis

I think there is little doubt that someday a court will permit a circumvention of the Communications Decency Act. As explained here numerous time, the CDA makes a website or website provider immune from liability for content posted by others. But there are constant skirmishes at the fringe. For example, if the website somehow “highlights” the posting or adds its own editorial comments, does it then become responsible for the content? What if a court orders the poster to remove the defamatory content, but the site refuses to cooperate in the process? Can’t the argument then be made that the website operator is then publishing the content since the original poster has disowned it? And while the CDA contemplates that the original poster will be responsible for the defamatory content, what if the person who posted the content dies and the victim is left with no remedy?

This last hypothetical is precisely the issue that is presented by a case currently pending in Illinois. The mother of US Olympic speedskater Shani Davis is suing Google for refusing to remove a blog posting that was made by a user who has since died. There is no doubt that under normal circumstances, Google would be protected from immunity under the CDA. But the blogger, Sean Healy, died of cancer a year after publishing the article in question.

The post by Healy was entitled, “Memo to Cherie Davis,” and claims that the speedskater’s mother made disparaging comments about the views of the US Speedskating Federation. Cherie Davis claims in her suit that she made no such comment. She further claims that because Healy cannot be made to answer in damages and/or remove the content, Google must step up and make things right with this now dormant blog, that just sits on Google’s server, continuing to defame plaintiff.

I’m hopeful that this will be the case that opens a tiny crack in the CDA. I applaud the CDA for protecting websites from liability. As I have explained here before, if website operators became liable for the content posted by others, none could risk having a public discussion board. But I always contended that the open marketplace of ideas can still exist even if we make website operators subject to cooperating with court orders. If a court finds that content is defamatory, there is no reason that a site should fight to maintain that content. The website will be protected by the necessity of a plaintiff having to go to court to have that determination made. Website operators contend even that is too onerous, since they will then have to remove the content, but this is belied by the fact that website hosts, including Google, already comply with demands made under the DMCA to remove copyrighted material.

I’ll keep you posted on the results of this case.

posted by Aaron Morris on May 9

A recent decision by the California Court of Appeal, which reverses a trial court’s decision to dismiss the underlying defamation case, beautifully illustrates how trial courts still do not understand the anti-SLAPP statute. It’s unfortunate the plaintiff had to go through an appeal in order to educate this particular judge. The following summary of facts and quotes are taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. I apologize for the long post and multiple citations, but I want to have a place where people can be directed for the proper anti-SLAPP considerations and standards.

The action appears to have roots going back to 2003, when there was an altercation between Rabbi Chaim Seidler-Feller, Director of Hillel at UCLA, and Rachel Neuwirth, a journalist working in the Los Angeles area. Neuwirth alleged that Seidler-Feller had attacked her without provocation in October 2003. Shortly after this attack, she alleges in her complaint, “disciples of Seidler-Feller maintained in public print that [she] had provoked the attack by making inc[e]ndiary statements” to him. Neuwirth denied these allegations. As a result of her injuries, she said, she sought legal redress and reached an “amicable settlement” with Seidler-Feller and Hillel accompanied by a letter of apology from Seidler-Feller, “published in various tribunals,” in which he “acknowledged that the attack upon [Neuwirth] was unprovoked, that he took full responsibility for said attack and apologized for his actions.”

The complaint further alleges that notwithstanding Seidler-Feller’s admissions, “in an effort to vilify and damage [Neuwirth’s] reputation further,” someone named Richard Silverstein published on the Internet a statement which “in effect called [Neuwirth] a liar” and took the position that Neuwirth had, in fact, provoked the attack and that Seidler-Feller’s “original version” was more credible than Neuwirth’s. Later, on May 3, 2007, Silverstein published on the Internet an article in which he referred to Neuwirth as “a ‘Kahanist swine’ thereby accusing [her] of being a member of a terrorist organization” and exposing her to hatred, contempt and ridicule and injuring her in her occupation in violation of Civil Code section 45. “The United States Department of State has issued . . . a list of terrorist organizations which include such organizations as Al-Qaida, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Kahane Chai, among others. To refer to a person as a Kahanist is to brand that person as a terrorist.” Silverstein knew his publication was false, and it constituted libel per se, she said.

On May 13, Neuwirth alleged (in her second cause of action), Joel Beinin joined the fray and published on the Internet a statement falsely accusing her of having made a death threat against him. At the same time, Silverstein issued another statement on the Internet reiterating the allegation Neuwirth had made a death threat against Beinin, although Silverstein knew the statement to be false. Accusing her of committing this crime, she alleged, also constituted libel per se under Civil Code section 45.

In response to Neuwirth’s complaint, both Silverstein and Beinin filed anti-SLAPP motions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) In his motion, Silverstein asserted Neuwirth’s complaint arose from speech in a public forum regarding an issue of public interest as both he and Neuwirth write about the “Middle East conflict—a highly controversial matter of great public importance and political interest.” He attached copies of the statements to his declaration. Because he has chosen to advocate tolerance and peaceful reconciliation, he said, his “work has attracted vitriolic criticism from those who, unlike him, believe that Arabs and Jews should not live together.” For his part, Beinin basically argued that the claim of a death threat was true and protected on a number of grounds.

In a 28-page ruling, the trial court granted both special motions to strike and subsequently entered judgment in favor of both Silverstein and Beinin. While the defendants proclaimed their victory, Neuwirth filed her appeal.

Analysis for an anti-SLAPP motion.

A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) “seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055.) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, was enacted as “a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (Id. at pp. 1055-1056.) In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court first determines whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action “arises from protected activity.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056.)

In the Neuwirth case, the trial court properly concluded that the comments alleged to be defamatory were at least arguably protected speech. But “protected speech” does not mean that the speech is immune from prosecution, and that is the distinction that appears to baffle many judges. Defamatory speech is never protected.* “Protected” simply means that it is subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The second part of the analysis still remains.

“[O]nce the defendant establishes the challenged cause of action . . . arise[s] out of the exercise of petition or free expression rights, the burden shifts to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must then establish a probability that he or she will prevail on the merits. . . . The Supreme Court has defined the probability of prevailing burden as follows: ‘[T]he plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’” (Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 537.)

“For purposes of this inquiry, ‘the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ . . . In making this assessment it is ‘the court’s responsibility … to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff … .’ [Citation.] The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ . . . to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Ibid., citations and footnote omitted; see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 ["the anti-SLAPP statute requires only ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability’ [citation]“], quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 438, fn. 5.)

“Section 425.16 does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning. It subjects to potential dismissal only those causes of action as to which the plaintiff is unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits (§ 425.16, subd. (b)), a provision we have read as ‘requiring the court to determine only if the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim’ (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 [58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061] (Rosenthal)). So construed, ‘section 425.16 provides an efficient means of dispatching, early on in a lawsuit, [and discouraging, insofar as fees may be shifted,] a plaintiff’s meritless claims.’” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63.) “The purpose of section 425.16 is not to prevent lawsuits that arise from the exercise of constitutional rights, but it is to deter frivolous and improperly motivated lawsuits arising from those rights.[] Section 425.16 provides a ‘fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal’ of frivolous claims that are subject to the statute.” (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089, citation and footnote omitted.)

Plaintiff’s claims must be taken as true.

The anti-SLAPP system fails when judges cannot make the distinction between the two parts of the analysis and engage in a weighing process. For example, assuming Neuwirth is a public figure, then she would need to show malice in the comments that were made about her. But in noting the obvious, the Court of Appeal stated that said malice could be inferred from the comment “Kahanist swine.” Some courts appear to believe that malice must be shown by some extrinsic evidence of evil intent, when in fact that proof can be taken from the words themselves.

If, in turn, there was a dispute over the meaning of that term (defendant claimed it was harmless), then the interpretation offered by plaintiff must be taken as true (who said it amounted to calling someone a terrorist). The standard is akin to that of a motion for summary judgment, where the motion must be denied if there is any material issue of fact. In other words, in determining whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed with the defamation claim, the standard is, “can the plaintiff succeed IF her evidence is believed?”, not “can her evidence overcome that being claimed by defendant?”. After all, the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion stops the discovery process, so it is to be expected that a plaintiff may have minimal evidence at that point.

The complete opinion can be found here.

_______________________________

* Defamatory speech is never protected, but that must be kept in context.  For example, if Joe Citizen falsely testifies during a trial that the plaintiff cheats on his taxes, Joe can never be prosecuted for defamation for that speech.  In that instance there is no defamatory speech that is being protected because the speech by definition is not defamatory. Defamation requires a false, unprivileged statement. Comments made in court are privileged, and hence the statement cannot constitute defamation.

posted by Aaron Morris on May 4

South Korean "Dog Poop Girl"

In America the right to make anonymous comments is protected. In fact, that is why many courts will make a victim of defamation establish a prima facie case of defamation before requiring a website to respond to a subpoena.  

South Korea is not so tolerant, and effective April 1 anonymous posting became illegal under certain circumstances. The new law is called the “Cyber Defamation Law.” The law provides that any Internet user making a comment or upload to a website that has over 100,000 unique visitors a day must append their real name to the comments they make. Sites must identify whether they meet the number of visitors threshold. If they do, the registration process must require the visitor wishing to post something to enter his national identification number.

The Cyber Defamation Law appears to have been a reaction to a story about the “dog poop girl.”  A women’s dog did his business on public transit, and she failed to clean it up.  Someone took pictures of her sitting near the dog’s leavings, posted them on the Internet, and she became a public pariah, to the point that she had to quite school and move away from her home.  Lawmakers in South Korea reasoned that the new law would make those who post Internet messages more responsible for what they say and do on-line because they can now be pursued legally.

America is unlikely to pursue such an approach anytime soon, but the case illustrates that the problems of Internet defamation and bullying are very real, and governments are struggling to find ways to deal with them.

posted by Aaron Morris on Apr 15

Backwards Thinking at Goldman Sachs

What to do when you are an investment bank that owes $10 billion to the government and some gnat puts up a website to trash you for the way you do business? If you are Goldman Sachs, you hire a New York law firm to send a ridiculous cease and desist letter.

The website in question is goldmansachs666.com. It was posted by Mike Morgan a short while ago.  He hopes that the site will become a public forum for all things relating to Goldman Sachs.  No doubt anticipating a possible backlash from Goldman, Morgan put a banner at the top of the site, which proclaims:

“This website has NOT been approved by Goldman Sachs, nor does this website have any affiliation with Goldman Sachs.  This website was designed to provide information about Goldman Sachs direct from the public, and NOT from Goldman Sachs’s marketing and public relations departments.  You may find the Goldman Sachs website at www.goldmansachs.com.”

Nonetheless, the New York lawyer, who I assume does not get a lot of calls from NASA headhunters, wrote to Morgan:

“Your use of the mark Goldman Sachs violates several of Goldman Sachs’ intellectual property rights, constitutes an act of trademark infringement, unfair competition and implies a relationship and misrepresents commercial activity and/or an affiliation between you and Goldman Sachs which does not exist and additionally creates confusion in the marketplace.”

So, apparently Goldman Sachs thinks so much of its customers that it believes they would go to a site which says the bank is of the devil, and believe that the site is approved by Goldman Sachs.

A spite site, standing alone, is not actionable.  If the first commercial site created on the web was Acme.com, you can be sure the second site was Acme-Sucks.com.  Such sites have a long tradition on the Internet, and no one gets confused about their purpose.  GoldmanSachsSucks was probably already taken, so Morgan apparently had to get creative.

When it comes to comments on the Internet, always bargain from a position of strength.  If you “demand” that someone take down comments with no grounds to back up that demand, the usual result will be that you have fanned the flames for no reason and for no result.  I turn down perhaps 20 requests per week to send cease and desist letters, explaining to the callers that the comments in question do not constitute defamation, and that it is folly to send a cease and desist letter to someone that is within his legal rights and has no duty to cease or desist.  Apparently New York lawyers take a different approach.

posted by Aaron Morris on Apr 11

The following Internet defamation case is illustrative of some points I have raised here and elsewhere.>

You may have heard of the Internet defamation case involving a website called AutoAdmit. Two Yale students sued a number of defendants, claiming they were defamed on the site’s message board. One of the named defendants was Anthony Ciolli. He was involved with AutoAdmit, but claimed he had nothing to do with the message board where the defamatory messages were published. The plaintiffs apparently came to agree with this contention, and voluntarily dismissed Ciolli in 2007.

Now Ciolli has turned the tables on the plaintiffs. According to an ABA Journal article, Ciolli is suing them along with their lawyers. Ciolli alleges that the negative publicity generated by the suit caused the law firm of Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge to withdraw an employment offer. He is suing for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings, abuse of process, libel, slander, false-light invasion of privacy, tortious interference with contract and unauthorized use of name or likeness, according to the story.

Anthony Ciolli

As I’ve said before, amateur attorneys will name too many defendants, thinking the more the merrier and hoping that even if someone is improperly named, some small settlement can be extracted from in exchange for a dismissal. You see this all the time in construction defect cases, where they name every subcontractor on a job, even though it is abundantly clear that some of the subs could not have possible contributed to the problems.  With the permission of my construction clients, I long ago instituted a zero-tolerance policy whereby we refused to pay any groundless settlement, no matter how small.  The risk is that you could end up going to trial when you could have escaped for, say, $5,000.   However, to date, that has never happened. 

The problem with naming too many defendants is illustrated by this case, where one of the named defendants did not go quietly into the night even though he was voluntarily dismissed.  The better method is to file against the key defendants and conduct discovery to determine if any other defendants can properly be named.  So, Ciolli may have a righteous claim that he should never have been named in the action.

But with that said, it appears that Ciolli and his counsel are making a very similar mistake by bringing too many causes of action. Let’s say a plaintiff gets creative with his pleading and sues a defendant under five causes of action. If he prevails on one or two of the causes, that means the defendant prevailed on the other three or four causes of action. The defendant can argue that he is the prevailing party, which may entitle him to costs and attorney fees. Further, the defendant can sue for malicious prosecution on those causes.

Keeping in mind that I have not reviewed the pleadings, I do not practice in the jurisdiction in question and I am relying on facts as reported by various news sources, I am still willing to predict that Ciolli will lose on five of the aforesaid causes of action.

The first major hurdle Ciolli is going to face is proving that being denied a job with a big law firm is a bad thing. If the comments by the plaintiffs truly prevented Ciolli from going down the big firm path, he should be sending fruit baskets, not suing them.  If the allegations are true, then the plaintiffs saved Ciolli from a fate of working 70-hour weeks for $37 per hour. See, Saving Adil Haq’s Career Life — and Yours, and Why Big Firms Don’t Work.

But setting the big firm aspects aside, the case appears to contain problematic causes of action.  For example, mis-naming a defendant is not an abuse of process; the process is absolutely correct, it is just against the wrong person. Further, if the comments about Ciolli by the original plaintiffs were made in the litigation context, I’m sure the jurisdiction in question will have a litigation privilege against defamation. (If the plaintiffs made the statements outside of the litigation, then Ciolli could prevail.) And while the standard may be different in Pennsylvania, in California the interference with contract action would never survive.

I hope the case goes to trial so my legal theories can be tested, but that may not happen. At this point the parties are still fighting over jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania federal judge decided that Ciolli could conduct discovery to determine whether the action satisfied jurisdictional requirements. I’ll continue to monitor the case.

posted by Aaron Morris on Mar 27

Courtney Love

Twitter comments (along with others) have now become the basis for a Internet defamation lawsuit.

Courtney Love, always a class act, has been posting “tweets” about fashion designer Dawn Simorangkir, also known as Boudoir Queen.  Simorangkir claims that Love failed to pay money that was owed to her.  Love claims otherwise, and refered to Simorangkir as a “nasty lying hosebag thief”, as well as accusing her of being a drug addict and a prostitute, according to the Associated Press.

Assuming the comments were false, the statements are clearly defamatory, but the case will still present some interesting issues if it ever makes it to trial.  Defamation is always about reputation, and defamatory remarks do not always translate to loss of reputation.  Given the context of the statements and the person making them, will anyone believe that Simorangkir is guilty of the acts claimed by Love?

posted by Aaron Morris on Mar 14

Happier Days at the Nursing School

Another reminder that you will be judged by what you write.

A student dismissed from the University of Louisville’s nursing school because of her Internet postings has sued the university, alleging that it violated her First Amendment rights.

The nursing school expelled Nina Yoder on March 2, saying her MySpace postings “regarding patient activities and identification as a University of Louisville School of Nursing student violates the nursing honor code which you pledged to uphold,” according to a copy of her dismissal letter, which was attached to the suit.

In her blog postings, copies of which she attached to her own complaint, Yoder makes caustic comments about Christians and blacks. I attempted to go to the website to make my own determination about the appropriateness of her comments, but she appears to have taken down her MySpace page.

According to an article posted at courier-journal.com, the nursing school is upset because some of Yoder’s postings are about specific patients (although they are not mentioned by name). In one of her postings, she wrote about a birth she witnessed: “Out came a wrinkly bluish creature, all Picasso-like and weird, ugly as hell … screeching and waving its tentacles in the air.” I’m not sure a patient would want the miracle of her child’s birth described in that way by someone who should, like any medical professional, respect her privacy, but I can also see that as a failed attempt to humorously describe what she had seen.

But there was far more. The school officials were probably equally unimpressed when Yoder wrote about how the nursing school is in downtown Louisville, adjoining an area “inhabited by humanoids who have an IQ of 10 and whose needs and actions are basically instinctive. As in, all they do is ––––, eat, –––– and kill each other.” She did, however, graciously concede, “OK, maybe I am generalizing yet again.”

As discussed in my prior blog posting, Yoder and her supporters are using the “there’s so much trash on the Internet you can’t hold my trash against me” defense. As Yoder wrote in her letter requesting reinstatement to the nursing program, “If profanity was grounds for dismissal for the School of Nursing, the nursing school would go bankrupt.”

The court has not yet set a hearing date on Yoder’s request that the nursing school be ordered to reinstate her.  We’ll know then if the trash defense worked.

posted by Aaron Morris on Mar 14

Liskula Cohen striking a pose

There is a saying in the legal profession that “bad facts make bad law.” More often, bad descriptions of a case lead to the perception of bad law. The case of the hot cup of McDonald’s coffee is cited to this day as an example of out-of-control personal injury cases because people erroneously believe it was only about a foolish woman putting a cup of hot coffee between her legs. Now, the case of an offended model may turn out to be to defamation what the coffee case was to personal injury.

Here’s the background. Model Liskula Cohen was clowning around at a party where some less than flattering photos were taken. (America’s Next Top Model has taught us that models look very different without their makeup.) Those photos ended up on a blog and the prepubescent boys had to make their prepubescent remarks, such as: “How old is this skank? 40 something?” … “She’s a psychotic, lying, whoring, still going to clubs at her age, skank.”

This case is being reported as the one where “a model is suing because someone called her a skank.” Thus, if she is ultimately awarded damages, this will be the case that is cited as evidence that the civil justice system is out of control because you can sue if someone says you are unattractive.

Look carefully at the comments. Defamation arises when someone falsely accuses someone else of, basically, illegal, immoral or unethical conduct. The comments don’t charge her merely with being a skank, but claim she is psychotic, a liar and a whore. The action would never have survived review if all that had been said is that she is a skank. That term is ill-defined and nebulous enough that arguably one could from the pictures form the opinion that word is an appropriate description. But what is the justification for the remainder of the remarks? What is the factual basis for calling her psychotic, or saying she is a lying whore? The comments go far beyond calling her a skank.

Call her thin-skinned if you want, but the case is about whether Google can be compelled to turn over the name of the blogger who made these unjustified remarks. Reports say Cohen buried her head in her hands and broke down in a Manhattan court this past Wednesday, crying as vulgar insults about her were read aloud from the “Skanks in NYC” web site.

Anne Salisbury, a lawyer for the blogger, is seeking to characterize the statements about Cohen as nothing more than “youthful, jocular, slangy” comments which are common on the Internet. And therein lies the rub; the fact that so much trash exists on the Internet is not justification for more trash. We need to defend the right of people to post anonymously on the Internet, but if we are going to fight for their rights, they should be prepared to accept responsibility when the comments step over the line into defamation.

The case was argued on March 11, 2009, and the judge is expected to issue a ruling in a few weeks.  For a great description of the courtroom scene, go to Obscenities Fly In “Skank” Hearing.  (Note that, once again, the title refers only to the “skank” remark.)

posted by Aaron Morris on Mar 14

A recent decision out of Maryland illustrates the legal tension that exists between anonymous Internet defamers and those they victimize.

Someone trashed a Dunkin’ Donuts, claiming it was unsanitary and dirty. DD didn’t appreciate that comment, and sought the identity of the person who had posted the comment. In deciding whether the message board was required to disclose that information, Maryland’s highest court decided that the victim of the comments must go onto the board and basically give notice to the defamer. This gives the defamer an opportunity to protect his anonymity by removing the offending comment (although some unscrupulous sites won’t allow the person that posted the comment to take down his own message). Then the victim must persuade the court that the comments constitute defamation. Defamation is not protected speech, so the court can then require disclosure.

Don't Bite Off More Than You Can Chew

It’s a tough course for the victim, because being forced to go into the lion’s den will often only fan the flames. However, as this case makes clear, a victim may well be barred at the door if he does not have the fortitude to take that step.

For a more general discussion of the Maryland case, go to Internet Free-for-All Promises An Ongoing Test of Free Speech.  For a more detailed discussion of the legal issues, go to Maryland High Court Sets Legal Standard for Outing Online Foes.