Daily Mail publisher loses challenge to JK Rowling ruling
Associated Newspapers objected to parts of the statement that the author plans to read in open court as part of the settlement of her libel claim
Source: www.theguardian.com
In California, if a plaintiff wants to sue a newspaper (or radio station) for defamation, the plaintiff must first demand a retraction. If no such demand is made, then the plaintiff is limited to special damages (the actual damages that flow from the defamation. Failing to demand a retraction can kill the action, because it is often the case that no actual damages can be shown. If the demand is made, the newspaper can avoid any award for general damages by printing a retraction.
Here is the statute in its entirety, Civil Code section 48a:
Required Retraction Demand
1. In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.
2. If a correction be demanded within said period and be not published or broadcast in substantially as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station as were the statements claimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or broadcast within three weeks after such service, plaintiff, if he pleads and proves such notice, demand and failure to correct, and if his cause of action be maintained, may recover general, special and exemplary damages; provided that no exemplary damages may be recovered unless the plaintiff shall prove that defendant made the publication or broadcast with actual malice and then only in the discretion of the court or jury, and actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from the publication or broadcast.
3. A correction published or broadcast in substantially as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station as the statements claimed in the complaint to be libelous, prior to receipt of a demand therefor, shall be of the same force and effect as though such correction had been published or broadcast within three weeks after a demand therefor.
4. As used herein, the terms “general damages,” “special damages,” “exemplary damages” and “actual malice,” are defined as follows:
(a) “General damages” are damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt feelings;
(b) “Special damages” are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of the alleged libel, and no other;
(c) “Exemplary damages” are damages which may in the discretion of the court or jury be recovered in addition to general and special damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing a defendant who has made the publication or broadcast with actual malice;
(d) “Actual malice” is that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.
You can still sue a newspaper for defamation even if you don’t demand a retraction within 20 days, but failing to do so limits any damage recover to “special damages”. In many cases, special damages are not worth pursuing, since they consist primarily of loss of income. Under proper circumstances, special damages can be significant (we recently won $1.5 million dollars of special damages for a client), but in most cases the plaintiff will have a hard time proving that specific business was lost because of the newspaper article.
Across the pond, they have a similar process, but with a couple of twists. The newspaper must print an apology, and if it does so, the plaintiff cannot recover any damages unless he, she or it can show that the article was printed with malice.
The dust up between Rowling and the Daily Mail arose from an online article in which the paper claimed an article written by Rowling about her time as a single mother in Scotland was a misleading “sob story”. The Daily Mail subsequently published an apology to Rowing, in which it accepted that Rowling made no false claims in the article and said that it had paid her “substantial damages”, which she was donating to charity.
But then Rowling announced she was going to read a statement in open court, stating that the Daily Mail had falsely accused her of being dishonest. The Daily Mail felt that was inappropriate, and unsuccessfully sought to block Rowling’s statement.
I can appreciate the newspaper’s frustration. The apology procedure is designed to undo the defamation, and to that end, the paper published an apology and paid a substantial settlement. If Rowling can now go to court and come up with her own characterization of what was said, which will then be reported by all the media, she is afforded the means to now damage the newspaper, even though she accepted the settlement.
For example, let’s say a newspaper publishes that you cheat customers. You demand a retraction, and the newspaper prints an apology stating that you never cheated customers, and pays you money. Now you call the media to court, and state on the record that the newspaper has apologized for saying you cheated on your taxes. The newspaper never said you cheated on your taxes, it might indeed believe that you do cheat on your taxes, and yet it is put in a bad light that goes beyond the original claim that you cheat customers, since the impression is now that the newspaper also apologized for a tax remark.
The newspaper’s position was that it never said Rowling was dishonest, and that Rowling should not be able to claim that it did, or that it apologized.
Gay Lawyer Takes Stand in Defamation Suit
The gay attorney suing Anapol Schwartz for defamation took the stand Tuesday to outline his departure from the firm and his decision to accept a job at Raynes McCarty…
Source: www.thelegalintelligencer.com
Quite the case. The law firm associate, Jeffrey Downs, was planning to make a lateral move from a law firm called Anapol Schwartz to Raynes McCarty, but allegedly his former firm informed the new firm that Downs was preparing to sue the former firm for discrimination. Raynes McCarty then revoked its offer.
It’s like second had discrimination. If Downs purportedly suffered discriminated because he is gay, and decided to sue on that basis, is it then discrimination to refuse to hire someone who sued someone else for discrimination? I’m sure Raynes McCarty did not give one whit about Downs being gay, so revoking the offer likely had nothing to do with that fact.
Let’s say I run a products liability defense firm, and I extend an offer to a woman to come join the firm. But then I find out that the woman is a plaintiff in a products liability case against a manufacturer we represent, and I decide that the optics of having a products liability plaintiff working at my defense firm would be really bad for business, and revoke my offer. It would be a crappy thing to do, and she might have a violation of public policy claim, since I am terminating her for exercising her right to pursue legal action, but it would have nothing to do with gender discrimination.
Ironically, Downs is now suing Raynes McCarty for discrimination and defamation. Presumably, if the allegations are true, the firm revoked the offer because it feared that Downs was litigious and wanted to avoid being sued, but in the process bought itself a lawsuit in any event.
Equally ironic, before leaving Downs had sent an email to his firm, seeking eight months of severance pay. That is the email that the firm is pointing to to claim that Downs was threatening litigation before his departure, which would make the warning to the new firm absolutely true.
[Update 1-19-2022:] I didn’t take a deep dive into the status of the case, but I came across my own blog post and was curious. Downs ended up suing both firms in the same action. He sued Anapol for (1) retaliation in violation of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (“PFPO”); (2) defamation (Count II); and (3) false light invasion of privacy (Count III), and the Raynes Defendants for (1) sexual orientation discrimination (Count IV); (2) retaliation in violation of the PFPO (Count V); and (3) defamation, against Stephen Raynes only (Count VI).
Both firms moved for summary judgment, and as to the Anapol Defendants, the motion was granted with respect to Counts II and III (leaving the retaliation claim), and as to the the Raynes Defendants, it was granted as to Counts IV and VI (again leaving the retaliation claim). Here is the ruling.
I saw two headlines for articles behind paywalls that don’t appear to bode well for Downs: Jury Absolves Anapol Schwartz in Philly Gay Bias Trial and Defense Seeks Sanctions Against Gay Lawyer in Defamation Suit. Obviously I can’t speak to the veracity of either headline.
Former 49er Ray McDonald sues rape accuser for defamation
“Former San Francisco 49ers defensive end Ray McDonald has gone on the offensive, filing a lawsuit Monday against the woman who accused him of sexual assault in December, as a way to try to clear his name in hopes of restarting his career.”
Source: www.usatoday.com
This will be an interesting case to follow.
McDonald was accused of rape after spending the night with a woman me met at a San Jose bar. She claimed that while partying with McDonald at his home, she bumped her head during a hot tubbing incident, and did not recall anything that followed until she woke up naked in his bed the following morning. She spent the day with him, but sought medical treatment the next day. McDonald never denied that he had sex with the woman, but said it was consenual.
For reasons I have explained here before, reports to the police are privileged and will not support a defamation action. If that is the basis for the claim, this case will soon be gone on an anti-SLAPP motion. But if the woman alleged rape outside of that context, then McDonald’s case will survive.
[MAY 23, 2016 UPDATE:] The attorney for the woman brought an anti-SLAPP motion, based on the fact that the rape was reported only to the police. As I predicted, since McDonald was unable to identify anyone other than the police who received the allegedly defamatory claim, the anti-SLAPP motion was granted and McDonald’s case was dismissed.
Reports to the police are privileged, and can never form the basis of a defamation claim. This case makes clear why that MUST be the rule.
For sake of argument, let’s say McDonald did rape the woman. (Her story seems a little dubious, but let’s assume it was true for sake of this discussion.)
McDonald, who probably has some money from his NFL days, wants to silence this woman and hopefully get her to drop the charges. So he sues her for defamation, knowing that she will have to spend tens of thousands of dollars fighting against that legal action. She may very well get worn down by the time and expense of the legal action, and agree to drop her criminal charges in exchange for McDonald dropping his civil action.
We can never permit criminal defendants to use civil proceedings as a means to intimidate witnesses, and that is why reports to the police are privileged.
That does not leave McDonald without a remedy if the claims were false. If he is found not guilty in the criminal trial, he can then sue his accuser for malicious prosecution, if he can show that the claim was made with malice. Malice can be shown by proving that the woman could not have believed what she claimed.
Court of Appeals upholds $14.5 million defamation verdict against State Farm in hail fight
The largest defamation verdict in Indiana history — more than $14.5 million awarded to a contractor who claimed State Farm Fire & Casualty ruined his business and reputation — has been upheld by the Indiana Court of Appeals.
In a decision issued Tuesday, the three-judge panel found Hamilton Superior Court Judge Steven R. Nation correctly denied the insurance giant’s request for a new trial based on a claim that roofing contractor Joseph Radcliff obtained the judgment through fraud on the court.
The case grew out of a 2006 storm that battered Central Indiana with golf-ball-size hail and ravaged thousands of homes. The damage tally topped $1 billion, with State Farm alone paying out more than $200 million on about 50,000 damage claims.
The payout to Radcliff, however, was not the result of damage to homes or cars — but for what a Hamilton County jury determined was damage State Farm did to the roofing contractor’s reputation.
Source: www.indystar.com
These cases are becoming so commonplace, I’ve taken to calling them the “second appeal.” Here’s the way they work.
The defendant loses in the trial court, then they lose on appeal. Left with no other way to challenge the outcome, they bring their own action, claiming the original verdict was achieved by a “fraud on the court,” usually based on some evidence the defendant claims would have resulted in a different result. There is support for such an action, but the circumstances for a successful fraud on the court claim are extremely narrow.
So it was in this case. The insurance company claimed that after the trial, it obtained a declaration from a witness who said the plaintiff had lied and withheld evidence. It claimed that was a fraud on the court, and the judgment should therefore be thrown out. That approach won’t fly. Courts want finality to their verdicts, and that is evidence that could have been presented in the original trial. A defendant does not get to call a “Mulligan” because it failed to vigorously defend the case the first time around.
In one of my cases, a plaintiff sued my client and we counter-sued. In the end, we obtained a large judgment, and just as in this case, the plaintiff appealed and lost. The plaintiff then brought an action for fraud on the court, claiming the entire matter had been covered by an arbitration agreement, and that we had “defrauded” the court by allowing it to enter a judgment, knowing the matter was subject to arbitration. You read right. The plaintiff brought the action under an agreement that contained an arbitration clause, and then claimed that we had defrauded the court by not invoking the arbitration requirement. The case was thrown out on demurrer.
Sleeping Fan Sues New York Yankees, MLB, ESPN for Defamation
Andrew Rector proved today that you really can sue anyone – even MLB, ESPN or the New York Yankees – for just about anything.
Source: www.rantsports.com
Clients often call and say, “can this person sue me for defamation if I [fill in the blank].” As I always say, and as this case illustrates, anyone can sue anybody for anything. The question is, can they do so successfully? Here, a sleeping baseball fan by the name of Andrew Rector is suing for the comments made by the sportscasters when the camera captured him napping.
Can he sue for defamation? Well, there is absolutely no basis for a legal action here, but yes he could type up a complaint and file it with the court. But will he be successful? The answer here will be, no. A ridiculous and frivolous suit. Defamation requires a verifiably false statement that would cause one to be shunned by society. The sportscasters did not make even one negative comment about Rector.
“But what about using his image without permission?” some will ask.
This question illustrates an interesting phenomenon, whereby people live their lives witnessing some reality, yet cannot apply what they have seen and know. In every television newscast we see people being filmed, often in a very unflattering light, such as when they are doing the “perp walk” after being arrested. Do the people who ask this question think that the network ran around getting signed waivers from everyone who appeared on camera?
One does not have a right of privacy if filmed out in public. If you are allowing yourself to be seen, you are allowing yourself to be recorded.
Of course there are limitations, based on a reasonable expectation of privacy. A pervert can’t hold his phone over a bathroom stall and claim it was ok because the person was using a public restroom.
And California recognizes what is called a “right of publicity,” meaning that one can’t record you and then use that recording for profit. If the MLB started a campaign to advertise that their stadiums are a great place to sleep, and used Rector’s image to promote the campaign, he might have a valid right of publicity claim.
But this matter really just came down to Rector being embarrassed that the sportscasters commented on his nap. He was probably teased about it at work for a few days. That is not a basis for legal action.
[UPDATE:] My prediction was correct. As reported by the New York Daily News, the court threw out (or should I say, put to sleep?) Rector’s ridiculous legal action.
Here is the video of the incident in question, which resulted in the unsuccessful legal action:
Can a Court Order Someone Not to Defame You?
I get many calls from victims of Internet defamation who want me to go to court and get an order to stop the defamation. In other words, they want a court order that stops someone from speaking or publishing statements that the victims deems to be defamatory. Is that possible?
Like most legal questions, the answer is, “it depends.”
California law is very clear that after a trial has determined that the statements being made are defamatory, the court can order the defendant to stop making those statements. The reason is that defamatory speech is not protected, so once it has been found to be defamatory, the court can order the defendant not to repeat the defamatory statements. Once the court has issued such an order, it can be enforced just like any other court order, with the court assessing sanctions and even jail time if the defendant refuses to comply.
The much tougher challenge is getting a court to order a defendant to stop defaming the victim before there has been a trial. Typically, it takes at least a year to take a matter to trial, and that may be far too long for the victim. A temporary injunction can be obtained in a matter of days, so that affords a much faster remedy if it is available.
But there is a problem. An injunction is usually issued with little or no time for the defendant to oppose it. The procedure is that the plaintiff files an ex parte application with just 24 hours notice to the other side. The plaintiff’s attorney may have taken weeks to prepare a carefully crafted application supported by any number of declarations from witnesses, but the defendant gets just 24 hours to put together an opposition. Indeed, it’s far worse, because notice must be given 24 hours in advance, but the application may not be served until just four hours before the hearing, depending on the procedure followed by a particular court. If good cause can be shown, the ex parte application can be sought with no notice to the other side. A defendant could be ordered to stop speaking before the judge has ever heard his side of the story. Is that fair? Continue reading
Morris & Stone Wins $1.5 Million for Internet Defamation Victims
In this case, we represented a business and the individual who owns that business. The defendant, a medical doctor named Pankaj Karan, was starting his own business, MDTelexchange, and traveled to an overseas company also owned by our client (we’ll call that the “foreign company”) and entered into a contract for the creation of some custom call center software.
And that is where the divergence in the two versions of the story begins. Our clients asserted (and proved at trial) that the working software was delivered on time by the foreign company. The defendant, Dr. Karan, claimed otherwise, and blamed the failure of his start-up company on the software.
Dr. Karan’s claims never made sense, because while the software would have been useful in his business, it was in no way essential. Blaming the software for the failure of the business was akin to saying a business failed due to a lack of business cards. But for whatever reason, Dr. Karan chose to blame our clients, and in an email announced that he was going to “work night and day to inflict the maximum amount of financial pain that is allowed under the law.” To that end, he ignored the fact that his contract was with the foreign company, and instead attacked our client personally, along with his other company, taking to the Internet to trash their reputations.
This is a scenario that I see over and over in defamation cases. Someone becomes unhappy with a business or individual, and decides to criticize them on-line. It might even begin with a laudable motive – just putting out the word to the public to avoid a business that did not satisfy the critic. I will vigorously defend the right of anyone to go on line and publish a legitimate criticism of a business.
But something happens that takes the person beyond a legitimate review. As the person types the words, he or she decides it’s just not stinging enough and won’t cause enough harm. In this case, Dr. Karan must have felt that a legitimate review of the foreign company, stating that in his opinion the software did not work as promised or was not delivered on time, just wasn’t hurtful enough. He posted two articles on his own blog, and sent an email to our clients’ customers. In the email and postings, Dr. Karan’s comments had almost nothing to do with the alleged problems with the software. Indeed, he abandoned his claim that the software was late, and instead claimed that it had never been delivered at all. He added that our client had cheated an employer ten years earlier, and that his company had failed to pay vendors hundreds of thousands of dollars. Although our clients had never received a single complaint from a customer, Dr. Karan claimed that “they are swindlers of the highest kind and have milked many of their clients of money and time.”
At trial, Dr. Karan could not identify a single customer that our clients had “swindled”, he could not identify a single vendor they had failed to pay, could not specify how he had cheated his former employer, and acknowledged that the software was in fact delivered. Today, an Orange County jury, known for being very conservative with damage awards, awarded $1.5 million jointly and individually to both of our clients for the damage to their reputations and business, caused by Dr. Karan.
In a standard civil action, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the case. This is true in a defamation action as well, but since truth is a defense to defamation, the burden of proving a statement is true falls on the defendant. I can’t fathom how defendant thought he would get away with what he published in this email and on his blog, but I think he may have thought he would be safe because we could not prove a negative. In other words, how do you show that you have never defrauded any of your customers? Bring in every customer you have ever worked with to testify that you did not defraud them? That would be impossible, and that is why the law puts the burden on defendant to prove the TRUTH of the statements. Dr. Karan could not prove his statements were true, and was therefore liable for Internet defamation.
Pankaj Karan was admirably represented at various times during the action by Randolph Catanese and Douglas Hume from Catanese & Wells, David R. Calderon from Barth, Berus & Calderon, and Palak Chopra from the Law Offices of Palak Chopra.
[UPDATE — January 2, 2014] Dr. Karan did not go silently into the good night. His attorneys appealed the $1.5 million verdict, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support an award of that size. To that claim, and in denying the appeal, the court opened its opinion with the sentence, “All things considered, appellant Dr. Pankaj Karan got off cheaply in the trial court.” Better yet, in commenting on our brief, the court stated:
[Dr. Karan] has misstated the record in numerous particulars, as shown in a respondents’ brief so devastating it has left Karan, like Job, with no reply but silence and a hand over his mouth.
Anti-SLAPP Motion Does Not Dispose of Action as to Unprotected Claims
How to Handle Mixed Causes of Action?
In a ruling that makes perfect sense, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an anti-SLAPP motion can be used to excise some allegations in a cause of action that involve protected activities, while leaving intact those allegations that do not fall under the statute.
In Cho v. Chang (LASC case number B239719), Jessica Chang sued a former co-worker, Howard Cho, for sexual assault and harassment. Chang filed a cross-complaint that was a clear SLAPP, because the two causes of action alleged defamation and infliction of emotional distress based on the things Chang had said about Cho to her employer, EEOC and DFEH. As I have said here many time, statements to government entities are protected, and the statements to the employer are a natural part of the redress process, and therefore are also protected.
But wait a second. The cross-complaint also alleged that the statements by Chang to her co-workers were defamatory. In some circumstances statements to co-workers can be protected, and indeed that was the argument made by Chang, but here the connection was too attenuated. As the court stated,
“Chang argues that her comments to co-workers related to matters of ‘public interest,’ but that is without merit. A public interest involves more than mere curiosity or private information communicated to a small number of people; it concerns communications to a substantial number of people and some connection with the public interest rather than a private controversy.”
So, if the allegations about the statements to co-workers state a valid action for defamation and infliction of emotional distress, must that baby be thrown out with the bath water just because it is contained in the same cause of action that include protected speech? Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Michael Johnson, and the Court of Appeal, answered “no” to that question. They both determined that an anti-SLAPP motion could be used surgically to remove just the allegations of protected activities and speech, while leaving any cognizable claims.
Nonetheless, the anti-SLAPP motion was successful, at least in part, so did Chang recover her attorney fees? In that regard, Judge Johnson was not very charitable. The judge noted that a party prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion is normally entitled to an award of attorney fees, but said:
“While Chang’s motion has been granted in part, the ruling has produced nothing of consequence. Cho is still entitled to pursue his causes of action for defamation and [intentional infliction of emotional distress], and the evidence to be presented at trial is largely the same. Chang should have been aware that Cho’s allegations about private comments were viable, and she should have addressed the other allegations in a more focused and less burdensome manner (such as a traditional motion to strike or a motion in limine). Chang’s request for an award of fees and costs is denied.”
Yelp Sues the McMillan Law Group, Claiming it Posted Fake Reviews
I get probably two calls a month from potential clients, complaining that after they refused to subscribe to Yelp’s services, Yelp responded by removing most or all of their positive reviews. If true, then Yelp cannot seriously contend that it is interested in the integrity of its reviews.
The claims seem supported by a recent action by Yelp. In this case, a small San Diego law firm, the McMillan Law Group, subscribed to Yelp’s services, allegedly based on representations that were made about the number of page views it would receive. When the results fell below what the McMillan Law Group says was promised, it demanded a refund. Yelp balked, and the law firm sued in small claims court. The firm prevailed, and obtained a $2,700 judgment against Yelp.
Yelp appealed, and doubled-down by filing its own action back against the McMillan Law Group. It seems that Yelp had been busy looking into the law firm’s positive reviews, and decided that they did not all adhere to Yelp’s terms of use. Yelp’s complaint is a sight to behold, alleging that the McMillan Law Group is liable for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, unfair competition and false advertising. Yelp alleges:
“The McMillan Law Group, a San Diego law firm specializing in bankruptcy, exemplifies the behavior that Yelp combats daily through its algorithms and investigations—the planting of fake reviews intended to sway potential clients with false testimonials. The McMillan Law Group’s efforts to mislead consumers are particularly brazen and disappointing given they have targeted some of the most vulnerable consumers of all—individuals who may be facing bankruptcy and who are looking for potential legal representation.”
In the complaint, Yelp details its investigative results, alleging that multiple Yelp user accounts were created from a computer located at the same McMillan Law Group IP address used to create reviews about that law firm.
In an interview with Bloomberg Law, Julian McMillan stated, “It’s bullying tactics. I get it. They want me to spend some money but I just don’t see how they come a winner in this [from a PR standpoint].”
As McMillan also notes, Yelp’s lawsuit seems like a really bone-headed move from a discovery standpoint. Since Yelp is claiming that false reviews by the McMillan Law Group have interfered with its contractual relations and caused it damages, it has now made all of its business practices and income fair game for discovery. It will also be very interesting to learn whether Yelp routinely brings such lawsuits to maintain the integrity of its reviews, or does so only in response to being sued.
For a detailed discussion of the love fest between Yelp and the McMillan Law Group, see the article at Bloomberg Law.
[UPDATE: May 6, 2015] Yelp apparently realized the folly of its actions, and today filed a Request for Dismissal, disposing of its action against McMillan Law Group. No doubt Yelp will claim that the case settled, and likely it did, but not in the manner that would imply. A plaintiff always has the power to dismiss their own case — there is nothing the defendant can do to stop a dismissal — but a dismissal entitles the defendant to court costs. Often plaintiff’s counsel will approach defense counsel and offer to dismiss the action in exchange for a waiver of costs. Since costs are usually pretty nominal in the grand scheme of things, it is rare that a defendant will refuse this offer.
I’d be willing to bet any non crucial part of my anatomy that McMillan did not pay any money to Yelp as a part of any settlement. Yelp had no way to show any damages, so McMillan was not facing any risk of liability; only the costs of defense. Had it been me, and Yelp had offered a walkaway in exchange for a waiver of costs, I would have refused, knowing that Yelp would dismiss anyway, but I would have the satisfaction of a cost judgment against Yelp. I’m sure McMillan would have come to the same conclusion.
Alternatively, if the parties become cagey about the terms of the “settlement,” with both sides refusing to give any details, then that will likely mean that money went from Yelp to McMillan. In other words, McMillan would not give up the ability to set the record straight just to avoid the comical trial and full access to Yelp’s internal records. There would have to be some strong motivation for McMillan to remain mum about any settlement.
Alternatively to that alternative, if Yelp really did have some dirt on McMillan posting fake reviews, the consideration for silence about the settlement could have been that Yelp would keep that information to itself.
Anti-SLAPP Victory: Reality Television is Free Speech
The reality show “Storage Wars” has created a case that offers some important anti-SLAPP (and litigation) lessons.
In December, David Hester filed a lawsuit against A&E Television Networks alleging that producers of Storage Wars rigged the reality-television series by salting storage lockers with valuable items before they were auctioned off to buyers. The producers deny the claim, pointing out that they have no access to the lockers before they are sold, but it could be that they are adding the items with the assistance of the buyers, after the purchase, to make the show more entertaining. After all, if the show was nothing but lockers full of expired National Geographic magazines, that would get boring fast. But I digress.
According to his lawsuit, Hester was told that his contract would be renewed for season four, but after complaining about the “fraud” that was being perpetrated on the viewers, he was told his services would no longer be required. He sued A&E and another entity for wrongful termination (huh?), breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith, unfair business practices, and declaratory relief.
Lesson 1: For every wrong, there is not necessarily a remedy.
Some attorneys just never get this. If I hire you for my television show, and I have the contractual right not to renew that contract at some point in the future, and you do something I don’t like, such as telling me you don’t like the way I am running the show that I’m paying you $750,000 to be on, then I just may decide not to keep you around. You are not some bastion for the public, given the task of making sure my show is pure. All reality shows are faked to some extent, and the viewers all know they are faked (although, incredibly, I did once run into a guy who thinks Ghost Hunters is totally legit).
It may stink that Hester got “fired” for wanting to keep the show honest, but if he wanted to make sure he never got fired for criticizing the show, the he should have added a “you may not fire me when I tell you your show stinks” clause to his contract.
Lesson 2: A faked reality show is an expression of free speech.
Can you sue Stephen King when you find out Pet Sematary [sic] is not based on reality? Then why did Hester and his counsel think they could sue A&E for its fictional Storage Wars? Not surprisingly, A&E’s attorneys asked the same question in the form of an anti-SLAPP motion. The motion was a no-brainer, because it involves a free speech issue of public interest, bringing it within the anti-SLAPP statute, and there was zero chance of Hester prevailing on at least one or more of his causes of action, so the second element was a lock. As I have explained many times here, a SLAPP suit will often make no mention of defamation or any other obviously SLAPPable claim, but nonetheless will be a SLAPP.
Lesson 3: Betting wrong on a SLAPP can be very expensive since some courts continue to rubber-stamp huge fee applications.
There is case authority for the proposition that if a court finds that a fee application on an anti-SLAPP motion was inflated, it can deny fees altogether, but I have yet to see a court follow the rule. In one case, I was brought in to challenge a fee application, and persuaded the court to knock off about 40% of the hours that were requested by the attorney who had successfully brought the anti-SLAPP motion. When the court stated in was reducing the fees by that amount, I reminded it of the authority that it could deny the fees altogether since defense counsel had been caught padding the bill. The judge responded, “Padding, what padding? I did not see any padding.” Well your honor, if the hours were all legitimate, then you should have awarded the full amount. But since you agreed with me that 40% of the time was inappropriate, then I would describe that as padding.
I have not reviewed the invoices for the anti-SLAPP motion in this case, nor do I know what other activities if any followed the original anti-SLAPP motion (for example, the plaintiff will sometimes request permission to conduct discovery following the motion and that takes time), so I offer no opinion on whether the time spent was appropriate. In the end, even after reducing the attorney fees requested by defense counsel, the attorney fees awarded still exceeded $120,000.
